Bahrain's Disappearing Shi`ah Mosques

Bahrain's official tally shows cost to Shiites of mosques crackdown

Bahraini Awqaf table of destroyed mosques (in Arabic)

Map of demolished mosques (with photographs)

Turmoil in the Arabian Peninsula

Altering the Scene in Oman

Comment on the impact of oil shocks on the Gulf, as part of the Middle East Institute's "1979 Oil Shock" Viewpoints (August 2009) (download here)

US Grievances with Saudi Arabia: Disentangling the Legitimate and the Spurious

2006 Bahraini Elections Presage Little Fundamental Change

[Original publication on this website, 12 December 2006. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

Bahrain’s elections for the Majlis al-Nawwab (Council of Representatives) concluded with a second round on 2 December 2006. In short order, these were followed by appointments to a new Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council), the upper house in the bicameral parliament, and the formation of a new cabinet.

The elections were notable for the participation for the first time of al-Wifaq (the National Islamic Accord Society) and Wa‘d (the National Democratic Action Society), and several other opposition parties that had also boycotted the first elections in 2002. Al-Wifaq, generally regarded as the most potent Islamist Shi‘ah party in Bahrain although it also has Sunni members, captured 17 of the council’s 40 seats. The society (political parties are technically banned in Bahrain) won in nearly every constituency in which it competed. This was not a surprise, although the overwhelming margins of victory were impressive. The society’s head, Shaykh ‘Ali Salman, won his seat with a commanding some 84% of the vote. Wa‘d, on the other hand, fared poorly. The grouping of mainly Sunni liberals, with many of its leaders drawn from leftist former exiles, failed to win a single seat, even in constituencies where tactical alliances were established with Wa‘d’s al-Wifaq ally. As expected, female candidates also fared poorly. The only woman member of the house, Latifah al-Qa‘ud, ran unopposed in her constituency (which included the uninhabited Hawar Islands). Her victory was widely regarded as a government concession. The closest actual race involving a female candidate saw Dr. Munira Fakhro losing to Sunni Islamist Dr. Salah ‘Ali, the head of the Muslim brotherhood bloc in the outgoing parliament. She appeared to be trailing slightly in a close race that would have been decided in the second round when a burst of more than 1000 votes recorded at “general voting centers” gave outright victory to Dr. Salah. As a result, Dr. Munira announced that she would challenge the results in court.

The establishment of the “general voting centers” was one of a number of opposition complaints about the election. Ten such centers were announced for al-Manamah so that voters would not have to travel to their home districts to vote. The opposition, however, claimed that the centers’ real purpose was to ensure pro-government electoral results, as in the above case. Tampering with the electoral process was alleged from the beginning but received dramatic attention when Dr. Salah al-Bandar, a British citizen of Sudanese origins who had been employed in the Central Informatics Organization (CIO), circulated a lengthy report that provided details on the government’s strategy to manipulate the elections and on the corruption of leading officials, including Shaykh Ahmad b. ‘Atiyatallah, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs, the head of the CIO, and the official in charge of the elections. Dr. Salah was quickly fired and deported while the media was warned against publicizing the matter and several web blogs were shut down after they discussed the matter. Although the government subsequently declared that the Ministry of Justice would oversee the elections, Shaykh Ahmad seemed to continue in that role. The government did not permit outside observers to observe the election.

The opposition long had complained about the gerrymandering of districts that assured a Sunni majority in the parliament. The 2006 elections saw Sunni winners outnumbered Shi‘i winners, 23 to 17, despite a Shi‘ah majority of some 60%-70% of Bahrain’s total citizenry. (It should be noted, however, that the divide between government and opposition in Bahrain does not fall strictly along sectarian lines. The long history of opposition to the government in Bahrain has included many Sunni elements and leaders as well as Shi‘ah and at least a few Shi‘ah have been allied with the Al Khalifah.) A second major issue involved naturalization, with the opposition charging that thousands of Arabs from neighboring countries (including non-resident Saudis who were permitted to vote at a polling center on the Bahrain-Saudi Arabia causeway) and Baluch had been naturalized in order to provide additional pro-government votes. One positive outcome of the elections would appear to be that the new council would be composed of a generally higher quality of members than the previous one.

The prospect of a newly ensconced and activist al-Wifaq bloc in the lower house raising embarrassing and anti-government matters will be tempered by continued government control of parliament, if not the Majlis al-Nawwab as well. Within days of the completion of the second round of elections, the King appointed a new Majlis al-Shura that closely resembled the previous one, i.e. a pro-government body that would counter-act any possibly controversial bill passed by the lower house. (In addition to the two houses having an equal membership, the speaker of the unelected upper house has a vote in case of any tie.) The council’s members include 20 Sunnis, 18 Shi‘ah, one Christian, and one Jew, as well as 10 women among them.

Assured that the elections had resulted in little practical change in the status quo, the cabinet resigned and a new cabinet was appointed on 11 December. It was little changed from the previous one and headed again by Shaykh Khalifah b. Salman, the king’s uncle and Prime Minister since 1971. Dominated by Sunnis and especially members of the ruling Al Khalifah, it appeared to contain two concessions to sectarian differences. A Shi‘i, Jawad Salim al-‘Urayyid, was appointed as one of three deputy prime ministers (the other two are from the Al Khalifah) and an erstwhile al-Wifaq member, Dr. Nazar b. Sadiq al-Baharinah, was named Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. Most portfolios remained unchanged.

Contretemps Over the UAE and American Ports

[Original publication on this website, 21 February 2006. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

It is difficult to understand the underlying motivations of politicians opposed to the US government’s acceptance of DP World’s purchase of Peninsular and Oriental (P&O) and therefore taking over P&O’s existing contractual arrangements to run various American ports. When P&O was British-owned, there was no controversy to its management of these ports. The outcry has arisen solely because the new P&O owner is “Arab” and a government-owned enterprise of the government of Dubai, a constituent member of the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Five objections to DP World’s assumption of these port management contracts have been aired. However, an objective examination of these complaints shows that none constitute sustainable reasons to object to this change in company ownership. The objections are that:

1. The UAE provided a base of operations for al-Qa‘idah members and agents. This implies that an al-Qa ‘idah base existed in the UAE similar to ones in Sudan and Afghanistan. A further insinuation is that the UAE government not only knew of al-Qa‘idah activity in its territory but colluded with the organization. Certainly al-Qa‘idah members used the country for transit. But so have millions of other travellers. The UAE, and Dubai in particular, have made access to the UAE progressively easier for many nationalities, including those of neighboring countries. American visitors, for example, receive a pro forma visa on arrival at Dubai airport. Freedom of movement is a touted American goal; why should the UAE be different? There is no evidence that al-Qa‘idah ever operated openly or on a permanent basis within the UAE. Permitting it to do so would run completely counter to the orientation and record of the UAE government. The UAE can be faulted for not recognizing the danger that Islamist extremists posed and for not tracking the movements of al-Qa‘idah operatives more carefully. But then the 9/11 hijackers not only travelled to and within the US, they lived in the country, studied in American schools and universities, and obtained flight training in American institutions – all without the US government being aware of their purpose. And the UAE government has reminded the US that it not only has provided its support and the use of its facilities for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq but captured a key figure implicated in the bombing of the USS cole hiding in the UAE in 2002 and handed him over to the US.

2. The UAE provided a financial base for the movement of al-Qa‘idah funds. Yes, al-Qa‘idah wired funds through Dubai, just as thousands of other individuals and groups have. If there is a sin here, it is a sin of omission, not commission. Dubai has prided itself on avoiding red tape and government bureaucracy. This has driven its emergence as a major entrepôt and commercial center. There are hundreds of thousands of expatriate workers in the UAE. Western middle-class expatriates think nothing of wiring funds to home accounts. But for low-paid workers from the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, the fees that both originating and receiving banks charge even on small amounts of money are prohibitive. Thus, they use the hawwalah system, whereby they hand over their money to an agent in the UAE. That agent writes or telephones his corresponding agent in the expatriate’s home country who then turns the money over to the expatriate’s designated recipient, all for a very small fee. Certainly, the simplicity and absence of record-keeping in this system can be and was abused. After 9/11, the UAE responded fully to American requests and put in place tighter controls over the financial sector and measures to prevent money-laundering. Is the UAE the only country to discover that its institutions had been used for illegal transfers of money by extremists? What about the American example of a few years ago when the IRA regularly collected funds in the US for the purchase of weaponry to be used in Northern Ireland?

3. Two of the 9/11 hijackers were from the UAE. Again, factually correct. But how can two people – or even several dozen – be considered representative of a population of over three million. American citizens have been imprisoned for participating in al-Qa‘idah. British citizens carried out the terrorist attacks on London transport in July 2005 and a British citizen attempted to blow up a US-bound aircraft with a shoebomb. Are they representative of their countries? Few UAE citizens engage in illegal activity of any kind, even fewer can be regarded as Islamist extremists, and the UAE government, rather than being sympathetic to al-Qa‘idah, is pointedly pro-Western. Any visitor to Dubai would know in an instant that extremism is not practiced or tolerated there. If anything, Dubai can only be described as open, multicultural, laissez-faire, congenial, and perhaps even hedonistic.

4. The UAE permitted its territory to be used for the transmission of nuclear technology and materials from Pakistan to Iran and other states. Once again, at best a sin of omission rather than commission. The Pakistani nuclear scientist who provided the technology and materials did so secretly without the approval – and apparently the knowledge – of his own government, let alone the knowledge of any other governments apart from the recipients. Why use the UAE? For the same reason that innumerable commercial enterprises utilize the UAE’s many efficient facilities – transportation hub, transshipment center, free-trade zones, developed financial sector.

5. Prior to 9/11, the UAE government recognized the Taliban. Yes, the UAE recognized the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan. But deciding whether or not to recognize groups that control major territory in a strife-torn country is not a perfect science. Nor does diplomatic recognition necessarily imply approval of ideologies and/or behavior. If this were so, the United States would have had no formal contact at all with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites throughout the Cold War. Why did the UAE recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan? Apart from the fact that it seemed to control much of the country and carried out at least some functions of government, the UAE probably followed Saudi Arabia’s lead – believing that having diplomatic relations would allow at least the possibility of wielding some influence with the Taliban and thereby possibly moderating some Taliban practices and policies. The canard that recognition of the Taliban somehow indicates that the UAE holds similar values and policies is instantly dismissable by anyone who has any knowledge of the UAE.

If there is a problem with security in American ports, it has not arisen because P&O has suddenly become “Arab”-owned. If foreign ownership is the problem, where were all the politicians when P&O first contracted to manage the ports? Much talk has been expressed inside and outside the Beltway about anti-Americanism around the world. It is hard to escape the conclusion that driving force of this ruckus is little more than anti-Arabism.

The Pertinence of the Uncertain Process of Succession ... Again

[Original publication on this website, 24 January 2006. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

Five years ago, I published two articles on succession in the Gulf, one in the Washington Quarterly and the other in the Middle East Journal. [Copies of both articles may be downloaded from the Publications page on this website.] In these articles, I noted that despite significant social, economic, and even political change in the GCC states, it is “disturbing that the mechanisms for the transferral of power remain disconcertingly vague and ambiguous.” [MEJ, p. 599]

Since publication of the two articles, three aging rulers out of the six GCC monarchs have died. But problems of age and/or health still bedevil the future in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and possibly Abu Dhabi. Even Oman’s Sultan Qabus at age 65 is getting on in years and has no clear successor. The problem of succession in the Gulf has not been solved: the question of who is to follow incumbent rulers remains urgent while no further progress has been recorded in dealing longer-term problems of expanding political participation and transitioning ruling families to a more suitable role for modern states.

The death of King Fahd in Saudi Arabia has put full authority and power in the hands of ‘Abdullah. But his succession and his rapid confirmation of half-brother Sultan as heir apparent simply postpones the pressing issue of succession. In the Washington Quarterly article, I described the succession issue in Saudi Arabia as having four factors. The first, succession to King Fahd, was settled with his death and the accession of King ‘Abdullah. The second, succession to King ‘Abdullah, was seemingly settled in part by the appointment of ‘Abdullah’s half-brother Sultan as heir apparent, although Sultan’s age and health may indicate that the problem will arise again in the near future. There seems to be little likelihood that the fourth factor, the disappearance of the Al Sa‘ud as kings of Saudi Arabia, will be a factor in the foreseeable future, barring sudden and unexpected developments.

But the third and remaining factor, i.e. the issue of generational change, remains problematic and seems just as – if not more – pressing now as it was five years ago. The transition to the next generation could not have been made under either Fahd or ‘Abdullah because none of their sons are deemed suitable. The likely path of succession is thought to run through Nayif and Salman and only turning to the next generation after they have had their turns. Increasing age and a possible weak spell under Nayif, however, may force the issue sooner rather than later. But the mechanics of transition are problematic as well: which grandsons of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz will become the first kings of their generation and how will succession progress from there once the first grandson is crowned?

Now that the Kuwaiti succession issue apparently has been settled with the abdication of Amir Sa‘d al-‘Abdullah, a scant week after his succession, and as the appointment of Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad as the latest amir seems imminent, the question moves back to the serious and uncertain process of choosing the next heir apparent, just as is the case in Dubai following the death of its amir a few weeks ago. The choice of the new Kuwaiti heir apparent is a two-fold problem: first, there is the question of retaining the balancing act between the Al Salim and Al Jabir branches of the Al Sabah ruling family; and, second, Kuwait’s own pressing requirement for a generational transition. The two issues are intricately bound up together.

The Al Salim branch has become unmistakably weaker in recent decades. In part this is due to the long reign of the recently deceased amir, Shaykh Jabir, and the powerful role played by his brother and soon-to-be amir, Shaykh Sabah. The latter’s influence became particularly powerful in the last few years when he emerged as de facto ruler during the illnesses of his brother Jabir and the heir apparent Sa‘d. For the first time ever, the formal position of prime minister was decoupled from that of heir apparent and given to Sabah.

But just as important in the demise of the position of the Al Salim was the disappearance of notable personalities in its line. The strongest member of the branch at the time of Shaykh Jabir’s accession in 1977 was Shaykh Jabir al-‘Ali, but his acerbic and combative personality led to his being passed over as heir apparent by Sa‘d al-‘Abdullah of the same branch. Sa‘d’s apparent incapacitation follows the death of Jabir al-‘Ali some years ago and the next likely candidate from the Al Salim, Salim al-Sabah, son of an amir and long serving deputy prime minister and minister of defense, withdrew from politics in 2001 for health reasons. One of the few logical choices remaining among the Al Salim is Dr. Muhammad al-Sabah, brother of Shaykh Salim and Foreign Minister, but doubts remain whether he is a strong candidate.

By tradition, the appointment of Shaykh Sabah as amir should be accompanied by the appointment of an Al Salim as heir apparent. But this is not enshrined in law and the recent public spat between the branches over the deposition of Shaykh Sa‘d may well point to the Al Jabir attempting to monopolize rule within their branch. But this prospect raises a further question: where would succession fall even within the Al Jabir?

In the Middle East Journal article, I wrote that “For the future of the family, it may well be necessary to select the next Amir – or, more precisely, the next Heir Apparent after Sa‘d – from a new generation. But the present generation took up public positions when in their 20s and 30s and have spent the last 40 to 50 years proving themselves and running the country. The following generation has never had the opportunity to prove themselves even though they are now into their 50s.” [p. 586] There is little change in that assessment.

My earlier observation that more systematic methods of choosing heirs apparent is required in the Gulf should be coupled urgently now – after the Kuwaiti spectacle – of acceptable and face-saving methods of easing aging and infirm rulers into superannuation. The long and sad degeneration in the health of King Fahd, Shaykh Jabir, and Shaykh Rashid of Dubai a few years ago turns the pretense that they continued rule into farce and only harmed the international reputation of their countries. The two problems are inter-connected of course, since in some states the heir apparent is chosen from the same generation as the ruler. This may be an additional argument for settling on the principle of primogeniture, or at least one of the sons of the incumbent ruler.

It is not just a question of transitioning to a chronologically younger generation as the present one dies off. There must be qualitative change as well. As I wrote in 2001, “Their successors – sooner or later – must come from a generation with formative experiences in the ‘retrenchment’ or even ‘post-oil’ periods. They must be ready to install new post-rentier economies and to embrace political participation by educated, sophisticated, and heavily middle-class societies. The essential question is whether this ‘passing of the generational torch’ will come in time to preserve the core of these regimes or whether it will be too late as a consequence of doubtful succession patterns. [Washington Quarterly, p. 174]

A New Ruler in Dubai

[Original publication on this website, 6 January 2006. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

On 4 January 2006, Dubai’s ruler Shaykh Maktum b. Rashid Al Maktum died unexpectedly in Australia. He was immediately succeeded by his younger brother and Heir Apparent, Shaykh Muhammad b. Rashid, who was also automatically confirmed as in his late brother’s federal positions as the Vice-President and Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates.

Shaykh Maktum’s death is unlikely to lead to any significant changes in Dubai since he had been little more than titular ruler and Shaykh Muhammad had been guiding policy since before the death of their father, Shaykh Rashid b. Sa‘id, in 1990. It is also unlikely to lead to major change on the federal level as the positions of Vice-President and Prime Minister are automatically allocated to the ruler of Dubai. However, it is possible that Muhammad may exercise more of a hands-on role in these positions, given that Maktum had little interest in exercising his authority and given Muhammad’s much more dynamic and aggressive personality.

The first of two key questions to be answered is who will Shaykh Muhammad select as his Heir Apparent. Will he elevate one of his two brothers – older brother Hamdan, Deputy Ruler of Dubai and UAE Minister of Finance and Industry, or younger brother Ahmad – or pass succession to one of his own sons. Maktum succeeded his father as ruler, despite younger Muhammad being far more qualified, because of an unwritten principle of primogeniture. It is logical to suppose that Muhammad will carry on the tradition and anoint his eldest son, particularly since neither Hamdan or Ahmad is much more dynamic than Maktum was.

The second is question is whether he will retain the portfolio of UAE Minister of Defense and will there be any significant changes in the new UAE cabinet he is to form, last shuffled just before the death of UAE President Shaykh Zayid in 2004. Dubai has no automatic right to the portfolio and surrendering it now might mean that it would go to the Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi. For this reason, Muhammad may prefer to keep the title.

A logical, though not by any means certain, successor as Minister of Defense might be Abu Dhabi’s Shaykh Muhammad b. Zayid Al Nahyan. An ambitious son of the late Shaykh Zayid, Muhammad b. Zayid was promoted from Deputy to Chief of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces about 1993. Although unable to succeed his father in 2004, he persuaded his half-brother Shaykh Khalifah b. Zayid, the new ruler of Abu Dhabi, to name him Heir Apparent in Abu Dhabi and, a year later, as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Relations between the two Muhammads – Muhammad b. Rashid in Dubai and Muhammad b. Zayid in Abu Dhabi – has improved in recent years and the two may strike an alliance over this position.

An alternative stratagem, even less likely, might be the appointment of Shaykh Sultan b. Zayid Al Nahyan, presently UAE Deputy Prime Minister and long-time Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. As a non-starter for succession in Abu Dhabi, despite being Shaykh Zayid’s second oldest son, Sultan could provide a compromise choice.

Fundamentally, though, Shaykh Maktum’s death is not going to change operations in either Dubai or the UAE, even though it might provoke some intense jockeying for position on both the amirate and federal levels.

Oman: Omanis, Ibadis, and Islamism

[First published on the website of the Tharwa Project (www.tharwaproject.com), 28 February 2005.]

A wave of recent arrests has brought Oman briefly into the international spotlight, a rare occurrence for the sultanate. Little information has become available about the arrests. Early reports said that an attempt was going to be made to disrupt the Muscat Festival, an annual cultural and entertainment program. However, the Minister of Information informed the press on 30 January 2005 that the detentions stemmed from an attempt by those involved “to form an organization to endanger the national order.”

Early media reports that over 300 had been arrested seem to have been wildly exaggerated. An activist in Muscat said the total was less than 30 and an unnamed diplomat claimed it was less than a dozen, while a regional newspaper published a list of 15 names. According to this list, those detained included faculty from Sultan Qabus University, the College of Law and Shari‘ah, Nizwa Education College, ministry employees, employees in the mufti’s office, and several imams of mosques. All of the arrested seem to be from northern Oman, specifically the regions of al-Dakhiliyah, al-Sharqiyah, and al-Batinah, and all appear to be Ibadi. (Another six were reported to be arrested later in mid-February.)

Although Oman’s predominant image is that of an Ibadi country – the ruling family is Ibadi, the more traditional form of leadership consisted of an Ibadi imamate, and Oman possesses the only large-scale Ibadi community in the Islamic world – the population is actually mixed. No reliable figures exist regarding the sectarian composition but an informed guess would put it at roughly 50% Sunni, 45% Ibadi, and less than 5% Shi‘ah. While the heartland of Oman is heavily Ibadi, Sunnis are found in large numbers along al-Batinah coast, in al-Dhahirah region adjoining Abu Dhabi, in the eastern town of Sur, and especially in the southern region of Dhufar.

Al-Ibadiyah is a moderate offshoot of al-Khawarij, the first secessionist movement in Islam, but it is very similar today in belief and practice to mainstream Sunnism. Many of the initial followers of the Ibadi subsect in 8th-century Basrah were Omanis and they brought the belief back to Oman, where an independent Ibadi state existed for a thousand years. That state was headed by an elected imam, chosen from the adult male population and acclaimed in his office by the entire society. Although dynasties frequently emerged, the Ibadi political expression is highly egalitarian in principle, a feature that is underlined by the absence of any special role in society played by descendants of the Prophet Muhammad.

The Ibadi imamate disappeared in the 1950s when a highly respected and capable imam was replaced by a weaker figure, heavily dependent on his brother, along with a prominent tribal shaykh and outside support from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. By the end of the decade, the sultanate – based in Muscat and headed by the Al Bu Sa‘id dynasty since the 1740s – was in firm control of the interior of Oman and the imamate seemingly was consigned to the dustbin of history.

As a consequence of this development, northern Oman has basked in political tranquillity for nearly half a century and the country as a whole has been free from domestic dissidence since the end of the Dhufar War in the mid-1970s. By and large, Omanis have adopted the outlook of their neighbors up the Gulf: the country has embarked on ambitious socioeconomic development and the citizenry have enjoyed a more prosperous life than their pre-1970 ancestors. Although the population is largely Arab, the Baluch form a significant minority, as do several ethnic strands of Shi‘ah. Inequities exist in the present state but minorities are not prevented from material and social advancement, either legally or in daily practice.

What then might be the conditions or grievances at the root of the present arrests? There are significant parallels with a similar wave of arrests in 1994. At that time, perhaps as many as a thousand individuals were interrogated and some 300-400 arrested on charges of subversion. A State Security Court was hastily convened in November 1994 and it sentenced about 135 individuals to prison terms; a few given death sentences saw their convictions subsequently commuted by the Sultan to life imprisonment. All prisoners were freed as part of the Sultan’s Silver Jubilee amnesty in November 1995. While the Sultan, in his 1994 National Day speech, accused those arrested of being Islamic extremists, little evidence was offered for this assertion and many in Oman continued to entertain doubts.

Speculation that the Omani arrests this year might be linked to al-Qa‘idah-related violence in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait is undoubtedly unfounded. Al-Qa‘idah sees Sunnis as its primary audience and those arrested in Oman are Ibadis. Even Oman’s small Shi‘ah community has been remarkably quiescent since the Iranian Revolution, with only a few incidents of pamphleteering and abortive demonstrations. The high proportion of Sunnis in the 1994 arrests can be attributed largely to numerous detainees from Sur and Dhufar – Sunni areas whose inhabitants traditionally have been more outspoken than other Omanis.

This last detail may indeed point to a principal reason behind the 2005 arrests. Oman under Sultan Qabus has seen enormous change, mostly for the better. But the country is troubled by an unequal distribution of income, falling oil production, rapidly expanding population and unemployment, and the entrenchment of a political and commercial elite who have shown little restraint in taking advantage of opportunities to grow rich, often through abuse of the public purse.

The last decade has seen an understated but definite swelling of disgruntlement with the current state of affairs. Omanis have been bombarded with details of radical Islamists, al-Qa‘idah, the fall of Saddam’s Iraq and the American occupation, and the continuing Israeli-Palestinian strife. Not surprisingly, many young Omanis have become disillusioned with their ruler’s and the elite’s orientation. At the same time, and from another angle, Oman’s headlong rush towards modernization undoubtedly has produced a backlash among Omani conservatives.

The demise of the imamate in the 1950s was due to military action by the Sultan’s forces and his British backers, not because of any internal evolution. The last imam, Ghalib b. ‘Ali al-Hinawi, is still living out his days in al-Dammam, Saudi Arabia. There are no sultans in traditional Ibadi thought and the present régime’s legitimacy is based largely on its ability to maintain order, guarantee opportunities, and encourage material prosperity. That some Omanis remained opposed to the “secular” ways of the new state and society should not be surprising. That they should band together “to form an organization to endanger the national order” is. The suspicion that the authorities in Muscat have overreacted once again cannot be entirely laid to rest yet.

Security and Political Challenges in Saudi Arabia

[First published on the website of the Tharwa Project (www.tharwaproject.com), 12 December 2004.]

Much concern has been expressed recently about the stability of the Al Sa‘ud régime, with fears that al-Qa`idah-linked extremism might cause its downfall, much as religious opposition took the leading role in ending the Pahlavi régime in Iran. But it bears repeating today just as much as it was in 1979: Saudi Arabia is not Iran.

To be sure, there is a long history of dissidence and even extremism in Saudi Arabia. The Third Saudi State was created in the early 20th century as a result of a campaign of conquest that involved resistance on occasion. All Sunnis within the Saudi dominion were expected to observe the Wahhabi (or salafi) form of Islam while the Shi‘ah remained apart and objects of discrimination. The efforts of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (ruled 1902-1953) to forge a permanent state out of these conquests was opposed by radical leaders amongst the Ikhwan, the settled bedouin who formed the fanatical armies carrying out the conquests. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was finally forced in the late 1920s to face down the dissident Ikhwan on the battlefield.

Pan-Arab secular nationalism posed a serious threat to Saudi Arabia’s unity during the 1950s and 1960s. In addition to very real threats from “progressive” Arab republics, domestic ideological stirrings prompted the emergence of the “Free Liberals” and the flight from the kingdom of their leader, Al Sa‘ud prince Talal bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, and some of his brothers. The mid-1960s also witnessed several waves of arrests in the Saudi armed forces. While there was much speculation outside the country of coup attempts, in fact nearly all arrests seem to have been of individuals who became exposed to ideologies outside the country and did little more than speak rashly of their political beliefs.

In recent years, dissidence in Saudi Arabia has centered on Islamist opposition, particularly as the appeal and promise of secular political ideologies has faded. But Islamist opposition has long threatened the state. Confrontation on such grounds dates back to the opposition of the hardliners amongst the Ikhwan. Islamist opposition also appeared in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, as religious and social conservatives defied the régime and resisted changes. Most prominently, a group of neo-Ikhwan composed largely of members of Najdi bedouin tribes that had provided the forces of the earlier Ikhwan, seized the Great Mosque of Makkah in 1979 and were dislodged only by violent force.

Salafi opposition and extremism emerged after the Kuwait War of 1991. This included domestic borderline opposition, ranging from hardline or conservative religious figures as well as “liberals.” Gradually, exile groups began to appear, such as the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) in London, a breakaway group known as the Movement for Islamic Rights in Arabia (and more latterly as al-Islah), the Committee for Advice and Reform (a now defunct group contemporaneous with the appearance of CDLR and begun by Usamah bin Ladin), and the Saudi Institute in suburban Washington. Finally and more seriously, a number of so-called “dissident clerics” directly or indirectly aided the emergence of an al-Qa‘idah-linked or -influenced underground.

Apart from the extremists, the last decade has seen the emergence of a variety of “reformers.” Like most Saudis, these activists do not wish to overthrow the régime or to replace it. What they want is for the system to work better and more equitably, i.e. to reform it. Who are these “reformers”? Some are “religious” conservatives who believe that the state and society have become too liberalized. Others are “secular” liberals. About a dozen of these were arrested in the spring of 2004. Three are still being held in jail and have been placed on trial for “criticizing the political establishment” and “causing instability” by collecting signatures for petitions and communicating with foreign media. But the appeal of “secular” liberals is tiny and a concerted effort has been made to bridge the chasm between Islamic reformers and liberals.

The agenda of the reformers has accelerated in the past two years with a series of petitions and dialogues. In part, this development can be viewed as a follow-on to the establishment of the appointed Majlis al-Shura (or Consultative Council) in early 1990s. The movement is notable for including some “dissident” clerics and a measure of unprecedented Sunni-Shi‘i cooperation. As for the movement’s nature, the petition titled “In Defense of the Nation” of September 2003 provides a good example. The document was signed by more than 300 academics, medical doctors, writers, business people, and government employees. Signatories were drawn from both Sunni and Shi‘i communities while 51 signatures came from women. The petition called for an increased constitutional nature of society, eventual elections to Majlis al-Shura, the independence of the judicial branch, respect for human rights, allowing civil society institutions to function, the elimination of corruption, a fair redistribution of wealth, better distribution of social welfare benefits (such as education, health care, housing), and enabling women to practice their social and economic duties. The government’s response so far has been little more than the announcement of partial elections in early 2005 for municipal councils.

The attack on the US Consulate in Jiddah on 6 December 2004 that killed nine, in addition to three attackers, and apparently was carried out by elements inspired by al-Qa‘idah if not linked to that network, understandably renewed fears that the Saudi state might not be able to counter the challenge of Islamist extremism, either in terms of deflecting its ideological support within the conservative Muslim community in Saudi Arabia or more directly as a security problem posed by orchestrated acts of violence. It bears reminding, however, that Saudi Arabia is not in the grip of a civil war and that this latest in a wave of violence carried out in the last few years may indeed be the dying gasps of an enemy that the Saudi government has doggedly pursued.

There is no room for doubt that the kingdom faces a severe security threat, much like the United Kingdom has faced in its many years of terrorist activity by the IRA. The régime’s response must be fourfold. First, it must continue to improve and enhance fundamental security measures and responses in order to meet and eventually eliminate these acts of violence. Second, it must separate the extremists from supporters – real or potential – in the kingdom, the so-called “dissident clerics” and their followers, in part by demonstrating that extremist views are as unacceptable and un-Islamic in Saudi Arabia as they are for Muslims elsewhere. Third, it must be more vigilant in remolding a more tolerant and multifaceted society that implicitly and explicitly rejects such extremist views. Fourth, it must create an atmosphere that does not attract young men in particular to extremism, in part by resolving the admittedly difficult dilemma of providing employment for an exploding population but also by psychologically incorporating its youth fully into a changing society, a youth all-too-often alienated by social marginalization and lack of a sense of belonging or contributing as much as by economic discrimination.

An analysis of security incidents in Saudi Arabia since 1979 shows approximately 144 security-related incidents over this period. (A comprehensive chronology and summary of security incidents in the kingdom can be found elsewhere on this website.) Ninety-two of these were relatively minor incidents, consisting of arrests, arms discoveries, demonstrations, and hijackings. Some 53 were more serious, involving fatalities. There were nine major incidents comprising invasions or bombings of mosques, military installations, housing, or office complexes. The first of these was the seizure of the Great Mosque of Makkah by Neo-Ikhwan in 1979. Only two other major incidents took place between 1979 and 2003: in 1995, a car bomb was set off at a National Guard facility in Riyadh and another exploded in 1996 at US military barracks in al-Khubar. But 2003 brought two attacks and 2004 saw another four. The pattern was mirrored in the acceleration of other types of incidents: 71 of the total 92 minor incidents and 44 of 53 fatal incidents have taken place in the past two years.

This recent explosion in security incidents is due almost entirely to a deadly campaign launched by al-Qa‘idah Organization in the Arabian Peninsula, a loose group of several hundred Saudi extremists. These extremists have killed nearly 100 expatriates in the kingdom since May 2003, as well as a number of Saudis. They have struck through large-scale attacks, such as the assault on a housing compound in Riyadh (May 2003), another assault on a Riyadh housing compound (November 2003), yet another attack on a Riyadh housing compound (April 2004), the car bombing of the General Security Building in Riyadh (April 2004), a multi-pronged attack on civilians in the industrial city of Yanbu‘ on the Red Sea (May 2004), a similar attack on businesses and a residential compound in al-Khubar in the Eastern Province (May 2004), and the assault on the US Consulate in Jiddah (December 2004).

As security tightened around likely targets, extremists began to employ a simpler tactic: five expatriates were either killed outright in drive-by shootings (such as a Frenchman at a bank machine in Jiddah) or kidnapped and subsequently killed (as happened to an American engineer who was beheaded). Just as much violence erupted in gunbattles between Saudi security forces and extremists when raids were conducted on hideouts or suspects attempted to flee from checkpoints.

The recent attack on the Jiddah consulate has been interpreted already as either a failure of security or as a confirmation of instability in Saudi Arabia. It is neither. It should be remembered that the attackers, although managing to penetrate the outer perimeter of the consulate compound, failed to get inside the consulate itself. While security around the consulate obviously needs improvement, the swift raising of a barrier prevented the attackers from driving into the compound and they only managed to shoot their way through the gate on foot.

Does the latest attack mean that the Saudi government’s campaign to eradicate domestic terrorism is a failure? Riyadh has contended that it has broken the back of the movement and eliminated three of four al-Qa‘idah cells. A constant series of raids on safe houses, shoot-outs elsewhere, and captures of caches of arms, ammunition, explosives, and cash, seem to point in this direction. On 6 December 2003, the Ministry of the Interior announced a list of the 26 most wanted suspects. A year later, 14 on the list had been killed, three were captured, and another one surrendered. That left eight at large. Two proclaimed leaders of al-Qa‘idah in the Arabian Peninsula were killed in succession. The Jiddah attack clearly proves that the movement has not been eliminated but the slowing of attacks and increasing confrontations between security forces and small bands of extremists indicates that the organization is finding greater difficulty in operating, is using less experienced operatives in less complex operations, and is losing much of its stocks of weaponry.

It is impossible to know how many active extremists remain in the kingdom. By some estimates, hardcore membership stood at more than a thousand at the beginning of 2003; other estimates put the remaining number at 100 or 200. Attrition has not only thinned the numbers but resulted in the death or capture of many of the most experienced and brightest members. The great danger, however, remains the recruitment of newer members from alienated Saudi youth, spurred at least in part by the anti-American campaign in Iraq. The danger is greatest in the Wahhabi homeland and disaffected and poorer regions of the country. A majority of suspects arrested or killed appear to be from Najd, including many from major tribes, followed by others from the southern provinces, particularly ‘Asir and Jizan. Although hideouts are discovered, arrests are made, and attacks are carried out in al-Hijaz and the Eastern Province, the perpetrators do not tend to be from those regions.

Does the latest attack indicate that the country is becoming increasingly unstable, even perhaps on the brink of civil war? In 1979, the success of the Iranian revolution prompted some outside observers to speculate that the Al Sa‘ud régime would be next to fall, and in short order. A quarter of a century later, the same alarmism all but proclaims the end of the Al Sa‘ud in the near future. This seems at least as unlikely as in 1979. The country is not in turmoil and the numbers of extremists form only a tiny proportion of the Saudi population. What the country faces is a serious security problem, not unlike that posed by the IRA for the British government. Its only threat in a larger political context is if the state proves unable to contain and eliminate the threat. The longer terrorist and dissident acts persist, the greater doubt will be raised about the capability of the government to handle the crisis. But there is little to suggest that the kingdom has reached that point, or that the majority of its population has lost faith in their government.

At the same time, however, there is no doubt that the kingdom faces serious problems. Nearly two decades of budget deficits caused by low oil prices have hampered development and the provision of services; it will take more than two or three years of budget surpluses as a result of the oil price rise of 2004 and 2005 to correct this. The population has exploded in the last several decades. The 1974 census showed a Saudi population of only six million. The 1992 census doubled the Saudi population at a little more than 12 million. The 2004 census put the Saudi population at 16 and a half million. Although a detailed demographic breakdown has yet to be made public, at least half the population undoubtedly is under the age of 16. Millions more have reached school-leaving age and are searching for non-existent jobs. Per capita income dropped by three-quarters between the boom years of the oil price explosion and the beginning of this century. Considerable emphasis has been placed on economic diversification but oil remains the engine of the state and society and will continue to maintain that role for the foreseeable future.

Politically, the country faces at least three major problems. Foremost is the brake on political development posed by the unyielding weight of the Al Sa‘ud family on the country. While it is undeniable that the Al Sa‘ud not only created the state but are the glue that holds it together, it is equally undeniable that the family as an institution has a stultifying and regressive impact on the kingdom. In part, this is due to an inevitable problem in all monarchies of uneven leadership. King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was an exceedingly dynamic leader who forged the Third Saudi State in the 20th century. But he designated his unsuitable eldest son Sa‘ud as his successor and it took 11 years for the far more capable second son Faysal to rescue the country and implement the first major reforms. King Khalid was not the best choice to succeed Faysal but fortunately he reigned more than ruled. His more capable half-brother Fahd ran the state on a day-to-day basis until he succeeded as King himself. The tragedy of Fahd’s kingship has been his physical and mental incapacitation in recent years, preventing the heir apparent ‘Abdullah from taking control and carrying out necessary measures in time. The problem of uneven leadership is replicated throughout the government. Members of the huge family occupy hundreds if not thousands of positions, large and small, in the bureaucracy. Some of them show great merit and competence; others hold their jobs simply on the basis of birth.

But the problem of the royal family extends beyond its role in government. The family forms an extensive caste, membership of which is defined purely by blood. By and large, family members are above the law, they receive regular stipends and are not required to pay for air travel on Saudi Arabian Airlines or to pay their utility bills. Many have entered business, either as hidden partners or openly; no one can compete fairly against an Al Sa‘ud business rival. The old division of responsibility wherein the royal family holds political power while the merchant class monopolizes commerce has been eradicated.

A second major problem lies in social attitudes and religious conservatism. The partnership between the Al Sa‘ud and the Wahhabi religious establishment – dating from the 18th-century arrangement between the political leader Muhammad bin Sa‘ud Al Sa‘ud and the religious reformer Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab that created the First Saudi State – has been the bedrock of the country’s politics. It continues to define the state as the center of Islam, not only because the holiest cities in Islam are found within its borders but also because of the state’s claim to be the spiritual home of Islam as well. This partnership threatens to become a ball-and-chain for those members of the royal family, such as ‘Abdullah, who seek to modernize the country. Even King Faysal found himself hobbled: for every step forward, he was forced to take a step backwards to placate the conservatives. As an example, he managed to gain acceptance of the principle of universal girls’ education but at the cost of placing control of girls’ education under the thumb of the reactionary religious establishment.

The consequence is a population at large that is deeply mistrustful of the outside world and swayed by radical interpretations of Islam. Saudi Arabia is the only country in the Middle East where women are not allowed to drive, move about in public by themselves, or carry out any legal transaction without the intervention of a male guardian. It is the only Islamic country that relies upon a system of so-called “religious police” or “morality police” to enforce such matters as the strict segregation of men and women and observance of prayer times. Not surprisingly, the maturation of young Saudis under such a system, reinforced by reactionary lessons in school, has produced a fertile climate for the recruitment of foot soldiers for extremist Islamists.

It also needs to be said that the long-standing alliance with the United States has become a third major problem. For more than half a century, the Al Sa‘ud have placed their eggs in the basket of Saudi-American cooperation. This has been manifested most obviously in the provision of an American security umbrella over the kingdom. In return for Saudi purchases of more than adequate supplies of military arms and supplies at top prices – not to mention cooperation with Washington in such matters as the Contra affair and the Saudi purchase of US treasury bills – the United States guarantees Saudi Arabia’s security from external threats. This arrangement paid off for the Al Sa‘ud in a minor way during the threat from war-torn Yemen in the 1960s, in a potentially more serious way during the Iran-Iraq War, and in a major way after Saddam Husayn’s invasion of Kuwait and the campaign by the American-led alliance to reverse the occupation and protect Gulf oil fields. Saudi dependence on the United States also extended more deeply to the development of the country, beginning with ARAMCO’s activities in the Eastern Province and extending to the provision of US government and private-sector technical assistance in a myriad of endeavors.

But the alliance has become an increasing liability on both sides. The American public and Congress have long demonstrated a hostility to Saudi Arabia, dating back to the oil price revolution of 1973-1974 and beyond. The emergence of Usamah bin Ladin as the world’s most feared terrorist and the presence of 15 Saudis among the 11 September hijackers has only compounded the hostility. Of the more than 600 prisoners that the US government continues to hold in Guantánamo, nearly one-quarter are Saudis.

Naturally, this has increased resentment by Saudis of their treatment in the US. The biggest problem in the relationship from the Saudi view for many years was unquestioning American support of Israel, a support that has become increasingly problematic as the second Palestinian intifadah wears on. The American invasion of Iraq, bolstered only by Britain and a handful of other countries, magnified Saudi indignation. In that perception, the United States has invaded a fellow Arab country and, instead of bringing peace and democracy, it has turned the country into a chaos of violence; it has made Iraq “safe for terrorism.”

The Saudi Arabian government may indeed have broken the back of the extremist campaign. But, as the recent Jiddah incident demonstrated, it has a long way to go to eradicate the remnants and restore order to the country. Even more importantly, the government must face up to the growing challenges in front of it and enact the types of reforms that will bring true social and political progress. The government has surmounted serious challenges in the task and appears to capable of doing so now. But it will not be an easy task and there is no guarantee of success.

Year	Total Incidents	Minor Incidents (arrests, discoveries, demonstrations, hijackings)	Fatal Incidents (involving shooting or bombing, and including security raids)	Major Incidents (coordinated operations against major targets resulting in multiple deaths)
1979	2	1	-	1
1985	2	1	1	-
1988	2	-	2	-
1989	1	1	-	-
1994	1	1	-	-
1995	3	1	1	1
1996	4	3	-	-
2000	6	3	-	-
2001	7	5	2	-
2002	5	5	2	First al-Qa‘idah-related activities begin with arrests
2003	38	28	18	2
2004	78	46	28	4
2005	35	22	13	-
Total	184	117	68	9

The Impact of the United States Election on the Gulf and the Middle East

[First published on the website of the Gulf Research Center's Gulf in the Media, Dubai (www.gulfinthemedia.com), 24 November 2004.]

As many commentators around the world have noted, the outcome of the recent American presidential election affects the entire world nearly as much as it does the United States. And the the Middle East and the Gulf are likely to feel its impact the most.

The two most pressing Middle East issues facing the re-elected Bush administration are the situation in Iraq and Israeli-Palestinian strife. It is by no means certain that a Kerry administration would have made much headway in solving either problem. But it is also unlikely that a second-term Bush administration will have much luck in accomplishing its goals in the region either – particularly since it has its hands full with Iraq and appears intent on continuing to keep its distance from active intervention in Israel and Palestine.

Early indicators of the focus and direction of the administration’s second term are for a continued and probably strengthened conservative approach. The resignation of Colin Powell as Secretary of State removes the last moderate – and moderating – senior government official in the foreign-policy equation. His successor, Condoleezza Rice, undoubtedly will take a more hardline posture on most issues and the State Department’s complexion will change considerably more if, as is rumored, John Bolton is promoted from Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security to Deputy Secretary.

Changes at State are mirrored by the apparent politicization of the Central Intelligence Agency where Porter Goss, a Republican congressman recently appointed by Bush to head the agency, has brought in staffers from his congressional office and the House Intelligence Committee. These moves have forced the resignation of the Deputy Director and senior figures in the Clandestine Service. Fears are being voiced that the housecleaning at the agency will produce a more ideological CIA and one that is careful to serve narrow administration interests, instead of clashing over them as before the election.

With Rice’s move to State, the National Security Council, to be headed by her present deputy Stephen Hadley, probably will have a reduced exposure, and policy in the Department of Defense is unlikely change unless the Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, is removed, a move that is beginning to look increasingly unlikely.

Within a few short weeks of Bush’s re-election, the outline of the administration’s second-term policy towards the Middle East already has begun to appear. Only days after the election, the long-intimated and full-scale assault on Fallujah was launched and increasingly strong-arm techniques were employed against other Sunni targets. American strategy seemed to be aimed not only at Islamist “insurgents” but at recalcitrant Sunnis who threatened a boycott of the planned Iraqi elections in January 2005. Washington’s emphasis on these elections, as well as their prompt holding at the planned time, have become a key litmus test for the administration’s perceptions of success in its Iraq policy.

The second aspect of Middle Eastern policy began with British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s visit to Washington. The death of Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat shortly after the election was seen as an unexpected opportunity to get matters rolling on the Middle East peace process front. Bush resisted Blair’s pressure for the appointment of a special American envoy to re-engage Israelis and Palestinians in meaningful negotiations. The White House still seems committed to the absurd notion that the road to Israeli-Palestinian peace lies through Iraq. This suggests that as long as Iraq remains in a quagmire, which seems likely to persist for some time, Bush and company will keep their distance from Israel and Palestine. After Rice actually replaces Powell, American disengagement probably will look even more pronounced.

The most the Bush administration seems ready to countenance is gentle encouragement for almost inevitable moves on both sides. Washington applauded Sharon’s decision to remove Jewish settlers from the Gaza Strip and it supports a fair and productive Palestinian election to replace Arafat. Neither development owes anything to American action and neither promises much payoff on its own. It has been months since the most recent buzzwords in the long-running saga, the “road map” and the “quartet,” have been heard and the emergence of new initiatives, with or without accompanying buzzwords, seems rather unlikely for the time being.

The third piece of the puzzle coming into focus now is the increasing assertiveness of the administration on Iran and its allegations that Tehran is seeking to build nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities. On the one hand, this very public stance can be attributed to the “just in time” factor: while it is too late to prevent North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, strong action now could stop Iran. At the same time, however, it should be remembered that American – and Israeli – animosity towards Tehran has existed since the revolution and tough talk and equally tough actions have emanated from Washington for many years prior to the current dispute. Before the election, speculation was rife that Israel might act to take out Iran’s nuclear reactor at Bushire. More recent speculation centers on the possibility of Washington doing the job. Such a step may seem unlikely but then so did the idea of an American invasion of Iraq in 2000.

Because the lion’s share of the Bush administration’s attention is, not surprisingly, captured by Iraq, with the Israeli-Palestinian dilemma pushed into the shadows, there is little room left over for initiative elsewhere in the Middle East and particularly in the Gulf. The tattered American-Saudi relationship undoubtedly will limp on with both sides grateful for every day it escapes renewed public attention in either country. The arrest and trial of three reformists in Riyadh, an action that ought to have raised a high-profile American protest, produced only a few muted noises from the State Department.

Similarly, the unbalanced and heavily security-related relationship between the United States and the smaller Gulf states continues without much attention from the higher levels of Washington officialdom. The uncertain course of Bahrain’s reform process, the question of women’s voting rights in Kuwait, and the lack of elections in the United Arab Emirates, are all but ignored in Washington. The death of Shaykh Zayid, a seminal force behind the creation of the UAE and the country’s only president until now, received scant notice in American media.

As far as the Gulf is concerned, the next four years look to be “more of the same.” Oil and security are the driving factors in the relationships, especially so on the American side. And as long as Iraq is in turmoil and the future of Palestine is unsettled, the Bush administration will not roil the waters with its Gulf allies by pushing for internal change or readjusting its relations with the region’s elites.

Bahrain: Political Reforms on the Threshhold of Stagnation

[First published on the website of the Tharwa Project (www.tharwaproject.com), 22 November 2004.]

The accession of Shaykh Hamad b. ‘Isa Al Khalifah as Amir of Bahrain in 1999 seemed to usher in a new and welcome era in Bahraini politics. The previous five years had been characterized by increasing violence and a mounting anti-government political campaign waged by various sectors of the repressed Shi‘i majority of the country. Indeed, the dissidence of the 1990s in many ways was simply the latest manifestation of a pattern that took place at various times throughout the 20th century. Agitation for political change received only a frosty response from the ruling Al Khalifah family and eventually repression.

This pattern seemed to be on the verge of being broken in 1999-2002 when Shaykh Hamad instituted a number of reforms, including an amnesty, the return from exile of the regime’s opponents, greater freedom of speech and of the press, an amended constitution, and a partially elected parliament. But his assumption of the title of King in 2002 seemed to mark an end to the progress of reform and liberalization. There is no question that the country was better off than it had been before Shaykh Hamad’s accession, but, at the same time, many issues and grievances were left unresolved and the prospect of further substantial change seemed to disappear.

As a consequence, these issues and grievances have periodically bubbled over into confrontation since 2002.1 The country has experienced more than a dozen demonstrations in the last two years, protesting the absence of prosecution of security force officials, the American-led war on Iraq, unemployment, concerts by Arab singers, Israeli actions against Palestinians, human rights abuses, and expatriate workers in Bahrain. More serious incidents included the hurling of a Molotov cocktail against a police bus and a knife attack on diners and the staff of a French restaurant because of the presence of alcohol.

The political situation began turning more tense after events in early 2004. The political societies (which are putative political parties) were warned in February and March that they faced dissolution if they failed to stop organizing a petition calling for the elected parliament to hold sole power on enacting constitutional amendments, and the government backed up its threats in late April and early May by arresting more than a dozen activists belonging to the two largest societies, al-Wifaq and the National Democratic Action Society. This action was followed by the arrest of others protesting the original arrests. The detainees were only released after the societies promised to shelve the petitions.

A few weeks later in mid-May, a demonstration in front of the US Embassy to protest American military action in the holy Shi‘ah cities of Iraq turned violent and a number of people were injured when security forces fired rubber bullets and tear gas. As a concession, the King fired his aging Minister of the Interior, a member of the Al Khalifah.2

However, matters seemed to reach a head in September 2004 when ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Khawajah, the executive director of the fledgling Bahrain Center for Human Rights, was arrested for calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Shaykh Khalifah b. Salman Al Khalifah because of his mishandling of the Bahraini economy and ignoring human rights abuses. Four days later, the government closed down the Bahrain Center for Human Rights.3

King Hamad stood by his Prime Minister and uncle and stated that he would not tolerate criticism of senior government officials. As a consequence, proceedings began against al-Khawajah on charges of inciting hatred against the government and circulating false information about government officials. His trial was hampered for a time by the outpouring of public support through at least four demonstrations of several thousand people each, as well as his own hunger strike in jail.4 In the midst of supporters chanting for his release and condemning Shaykh Khalifah, al-Khawajah was sentenced on 21 November to a year in prison. A few hours later, the king blinked and suspended his sentence to time already served.

King Hamad’s attitude is but one of several key indicators of Bahrain’s political health that bear watching – but perhaps the most important one. Shaykh Khalifah is generally regarded as the most hated man in Bahrain and it is widely believed that he has run the country to his own benefit for decades, growing enormously rich in the process, and has been personally responsible for supervising the repression of human rights and thwarting equality for Bahrain’s majority Shi‘ah population. Upon Hamad’s accession in 1999, it could be argued that the new ruler needed to be cautious in his actions vis-B-vis his uncle, the all-powerful Prime Minister. But the King’s decision, five years later, to back his uncle against his people’s opposition, does not bode well for the future of liberalization and reform in Bahrain.

Notes:
1. A summary of the dissidence of the late 1990s is to be found in J.E. Peterson, “Bahrain: The 1994-1999 Uprising,” Arabian Peninsula Background Note No. APBN-002 (January 2004), posted elsewhere on this website, and on www.JEPeterson.net. Background to, and an evaluation of, the process of political change from Shaykh Hamad’s accession through mid-2004 is in J.E. Peterson, “The Promise and Reality of Bahraini Reforms,” in Joshua Teitelbaum, ed., Political Liberalization in the Gulf (forthcoming).

2. In addition to these activities, Bahraini authorities arrested six Sunni Salafi Islamists with alleged connections to al-Qa‘idah in June 2004 but released them on the following day. Five had been arrested, and released, on similar charges in February 2003. But when the US State Department issued a warning that extremist groups in Bahrain were planning attacks, the same men were arrested yet again and four were kept in jail pending trial to begin in December 2004.

3. Ironically, the center’s 2003 annual report, released a few months earlier, had praised the government’s commitment to human rights, its renunciation of arbitrary arrests, its tolerance of peaceful rallies and demonstrations, and an increased freedom of speech.

4. The arrest of al-Khawajah came on the heels of the March 2004 arrest of ‘Abd al-Ra‘uf ‘Abdullah Ahmad al-Shayib, a spokesman for the National Committee for Martyrs and Torture Victims, on charges of committing “immoral indecency” with an Indonesian housemaid. Many observers claimed that the charge was trumped up to stop the committee’s planned protest at Bahrain’s first Formula One car race.

A Human Rights Fiasco in Bahrain

[Original publication on this website, 29 October 2004. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

The stagnant nature of reform in Bahrain took an ominous turn when ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Khawajah, the executive director of the fledgling Bahrain Center for Human Rights, was arrested on 25 September 2004 for calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Shaykh Khalifah b. Salman Al Khalifah because of his mishandling of the Bahraini economy and ignoring human rights abuses. Four days later, the government closed down the Bahrain Center for Human Rights. (Ironically, the center’s 2003 annual report, released a few months earlier, had praised the government’s commitment to human rights, its renunciation of arbitrary arrests, its tolerance of peaceful rallies and demonstrations, and an increased freedom of speech.) Attempts to try al-Khawajah on charges of inciting hatred against the government and circulating false information about government officials have been hampered, at least temporarily, by the outpouring of public support through at least four demonstrations of several thousand people each.

Shaykh Khalifah is notorious for having run the country to his own benefit for decades, growing enormously rich in the process, and having supervised the repression of human rights and thwarting equality for Bahrain’s majority Shi‘ah population. Upon the accession in 1999 of Shaykh Hamad b. ‘Isa as Amir (later restyled King), it could be argued that the new ruler needed to be cautious in his actions vis-B-vis his uncle, the all-powerful Prime Minister. But the King’s decision, five years later, to back his uncle against his people’s opposition, does not bode well for the future of liberalization and reform in Bahrain.

Women in Gulf Politics: An Update

[Original publication on this website, 29 October 2004. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

Oman recently appointed its third female minister, to head a new Ministry of Social Work; women also head the Ministry of Higher Education and the Ministry of Tourism. The Sultanate thus forges farther ahead of its fellow GCC members in this regard. The timing is fortuitous as the Kuwaiti National Assembly prepares to debate extending the rights to vote and to run for the membership National Assembly to women. While women already enjoy such rights in Bahrain and Qatar, developments in Kuwait are significant because its National Assembly exercises far more power and assertiveness than similar institutions in its GCC neighbors. Oman may have three women in its Council of Ministers but neither men nor women in its elected Majlis al-Shura possess the right to review policy in the key areas of financial policy, defense, and foreign affairs, or to challenge political appointments – features for which the Kuwait National Assembly is noted.

Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia continue to lag behind in the GCC. Neither country exhibits any elected consultative assembly or legislative body. While a few women hold significant positions in the UAE, women’s rights in Saudi Arabia remain inexcusably ignored. A recent complaint in the Arab News (Jiddah) noted that while women in Saudi Arabia have the right to obtain their own identification cards, male guardians must make out the application for the cards and collect them; thus, many women are still effectively denied even this right.

Footnote: Three days after this comment was posted, the UAE reshuffled its cabinet. Among the new appointees was Shaykhah Lubnah al-Qasimi, a niece of the Ruler of Sharjah. She becomes the Minister of Economy and Planning, a key portfolio.

Civilian Casualties in Iraq

[Original publication on this website, 16 September 2004; revised 29 October 2004. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

Not long ago the United States government announced the death toll of American service personnel since the beginning of the war against Iraq had crossed the 1000 mark. But the administration in Washington pointedly does not release information on the number of Iraq civilian casualties during this same period. Most American media outlets are just as negligent in ignoring these casualties. While the total cost to the Iraqi people can only be estimated and never determined accurately, www.iraqbodycount.net keeps one of the most informed tallies. As of the date of writing, between 14,200 and 16,300 Iraqi civilians had died in the present conflict. And, worst of all, there is no end in sight.

But the count maintained by IraqBodyCount is restricted to casualties reported by journalists. On 29 October 2004, The Lancet (www.thelancet.com/journal) published the results of an extensive research study conducted by the Johns Hopkins University Center for International Emergency, Disaster, and Refugee Studies, aided by doctors from al-Mustansiriyah University Medical School in Baghdad. This study, based on interviews carried out with nearly 1000 families in 33 communities in Iraq (and excluding results from Fallujah), concluded that the war has caused the deaths of more than 100,000 Iraqis, many of them from air strikes by the occupying forces and more than half of these being women and children. Violent death has become by far the most common cause of death in post-invasion Iraq.

Bahrain and the Gulf: Wider Implications of Bahrain's Quest for Political Reform

[Original publication on this website, 15 July 2004. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

A half-decade of prolonged and often violent dissidence in Bahrain ended in 1999 with the accession to the throne of Shaykh Hamad b. ‘Isa as Amir. In short order, Shaykh Hamad instituted a number of reforms, including an amnesty, the return from exile of the regime’s opponents, greater freedom of speech and of the press, an amended constitution, and a partially elected parliament. But Shaykh Hamad’s assumption of the title of King in 2002 seemed to mark an end to the progress of reform and liberalization. Yes, the country was better off than it had been before Shaykh Hamad’s accession, but, at the same time, many issues and grievances were left unresolved and the prospect of further substantial change seemed to disappear.

Can and should Bahrain be considered a model for political change in the Gulf? On the one hand, it can be argued that yes, it should because Bahrain shares common fundamentals with its neighbors: all the GCC states face the common question of how to achieve true constitutionalism; they all exhibit similar roles played by hereditary rulers and privileged ruling families; they all face the problems of economic diversification and corruption; and they all are divided over the extent of political participation that should be allowed.

On the other hand, Bahrain may not serve as the right model because of unique factors to the kingdom: it is the only one of the GCC states to experience a post-oil economy and it is a poor country in relation to the others; it is the only GCC state in which the Shi‘ah predominate, and their second-class status and history of repression is not such a factor elsewhere apart from Saudi Arabia (where the Shi‘ah form a minority largely confined to the Eastern Province); there is a long history in Bahrain of antagonism between government and opposition; and, in fact, just the history of a highly organized, mobilized, and assertive opposition of various ideological hues sets Bahrain apart from the other five.

The principal lesson of Bahrain in this context for the rest of the GCC (insofar as there may be said to be a lesson) is that all the accomplishments of the brief window of reform have been “gifts” of the ruler. And these “gifts” appear to have been “offered” essentially to defuse a volatile situation and not to advance the cause of constitutionalism. Despite years of opposition and agitation, the people have been unable to claim real rights or achieve an actual constitutional basis of equality, or true citizenship, or even ownership of their own country. As many in Bahrain (and throughout the Gulf) complain, the ruling family treats the country as their property and only tolerates the residence of the people therein.

The changes or accomplishments achieved in Bahrain have been the result of internal pressure (“bottom-up”), including confrontation, violence, and even deaths. The country has not even returned to the political status of the early 1970s with its elected National Assembly and heady expectations of progress in the early days of independence.

But Bahrain has seen the apparent limits of this approach. The “bottom-up” approach has produced only a loosening of the pressure valve. King Hamad has “given” his concessions and thus has restored the supremacy of the “top-down” approach. Not surprisingly, this approach will be much slower, much more incremental, and far more peripheral, rather than engendering fundamental change.

Saudi-American Security Relations

[An adaptation of remarks presented at the Saudi-US Relations Symposium, Portland State University, 26 January 2004. Original publication on this website, 30 January 2004. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

American-Saudi security relations have a long and successful history, beginning with the fateful 1945 meeting between President Franklin Roosevelt and King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, Saudi Arabia’s participation in the Lend-Lease program, its declaration of war on Germany, and its role as a founding member of the United Nations.

Just a few of the more notable examples of milestones in this history include:
• the signing of a military cooperation agreement in 1945, which led to the establishment of Dhahran Air Base in 1946 (closed in 1962);
• the establishment of the United States Military Training mission (USMTM) for training Saudi forces in 1951 (following upon a similar British military mission that operated from 1947 to 1951);
• the transfer of a dozen F-86 fighter aircraft to the kingdom in 1957;
• the stationing of a US air force squadron in SA during 1963-1964 to demonstrate support for Saudi Arabia during a time of threat from Egypt during the Yemen civil war;
• American perception of Saudi Arabia as one of the “twin pillars” following British withdrawal from the Gulf (1971);
• the loan and then sale of AWACS airborne radar aircraft and F-15 combat aircraft following the demise of Iran in 1979 as the other “pillar,” complemented by a major modernization program for the Saudi Arabian National Guard;
• growing cooperation on various fronts during the Iran-Iraq War;
• Saudi Arabia’s role as the principal base for Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and the deployment of Saudi armed forces in combat in support of American and other coalition forces; and
• the use of Saudi facilities and air space as part of the international sanctions regime against Iraq from 1991 to 2003.

Then came the cataclysmic events of 11 September 2001 which produced a new set of serious strains in the US-Saudi “special relationship.” It should not be forgotten that significant strains in the relationship had appeared long before then: the Arab-Israeli conflict; differences over oil; opposition within the US to the arch-conservative nature of Saudi society (involving such concerns as restrictions on freedom of religion and the role of women), US charges of a Saudi lack of – or at least lukewarm – cooperation in investigation of the June 1996 bombing of the US military barracks at al-Khubar, and differences over appropriate policy toward Saddam Husayn’s Iraq.

Suddenly, these differences were surmounted by tensions over:
• the presence of 15 Saudis among the 19 hijackers of 11 September, and indeed the Saudi origins of Usamah b. Ladin;
• US allegations of a Saudi reluctance to confront Saudi extremists within the kingdom;
• US allegations of Saudi slowness to act to curb financial flows to terrorists;
• US allegations that Saudi Arabia and particularly the predominant expression of Islam there, Wahhabism, fosters hatred of other religions and cultures;
• US allegations that prominent Saudi businessmen and even members of royal family supported al-Qa‘idah and/or other extremists; and
• a Saudi reluctance to provide support for US attack on Iraq in spring 2003.

Given this negative atmosphere, where do US-Saudi security relations go from here? In the medium- to long-term, it seems clear that the present atmosphere of allegations and suspicions will ameliorate, at least in part. No doubt, public opinion will remain wary and Congress (never known for its friendliness to the Arab world) will continue to snarl. But no US administration is likely to deliberately and foolhardily jeopardize a productive and mutually beneficial relationship.

Why? Simply put, the reasons why Saudi Arabia is important to the US remain as true now as they did before 11 September. First and foremost is the oil factor. Saudi Arabia is world’s largest exporter, presently exporting approximately 8.5 million barrels a day, roughly one-third of total OPEC production; at times it has been the largest single supplier of crude oil to the US; and it possesses one-quarter of total world reserves.

A second and vitally important reason is Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical setting. It lies at the crossroads of Middle Eastern security. It is a key Gulf player because of its presence in the Gulf, its ties to the smaller Gulf monarchies, and the location of its oilfields in the Gulf. But the kingdom’s western boundary is the Red Sea and it also possesses a long, porous land border with Yemen. This forces the kingdom to be involved in Yemeni, Red Sea, and even Horn of Africa affairs. To the north, it borders the Fertile Crescent, which gives rise to complicated entanglement in northern Arab politics.

Another reason for Saudi Arabia’s importance is its influence on the region and the wider Islamic world. In the Middle East, the kingdom dominates the Arabian Peninsula, has long been a principal backer of Jordan, and brokered the accord that essentially brought an end to the Lebanese civil war. It is home to Islam’s holiest sites at Makkah and al-Madinah and it feels it exercises a special responsibility for the welfare of Muslims everywhere. And since 11 September 2001, and especially in recent months, it has become the principal battleground between the forces of moderation and extremism in Islam.

Another reason for its importance lies in its role as the linchpin of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As the largest and most powerful of the GCC’s six members, it is obvious that as Saudi Arabia goes, so goes the GCC. Finally, the kingdom is important for its influence on Arab-Israeli matters. While it has always shunned direct contacts with Israel and is a staunch supporter of Arab positions and Palestinian rights, it has also sought to play a moderating role in Arab politics, to promote the prospects of peace, and to persuade its Arab allies to keep open channels for negotiation – and thus has served as an important, if reticent actor in this arena.

The key concern for US policymakers is not whether Saudi Arabia should remain a key partner in Gulf security matters, but instead whether the Al Sa‘ud royal family can continue to exercise effective leadership and remain dependable partners – and thereby ensure that Saudi Arabia remains a dependable partner.

Simply put, Saudi Arabia is still the best fit for a regional partner or platform for US security goals in the Gulf. Alternative partners are either not realistic or nearly as valuable. Iraq is in a mess and will remain so for years to come. Even more, the rosy views of some American commentators that an American-liberated, American-constructed Iraqi state will provide permanent facilities for US military use should take note of the British experience in post-colonial independent Iraq.

Israel is useful to the United States in certain respects but in terms of Gulf security, it is as much – if not more of – a liability than an asset. Pakistan, while an invaluable and necessary ally in the so-called “war on terror,” has an unsteady military government, sectarian strife, and regional-ethnic divisions that clearly make any alliance uncertain.

Afghanistan remains in as much of a mess as Iraq and, in any case, is too remote and inaccessible to be of much value for the Gulf. Central Asia is even more of the same. The other GCC countries, while already proving their usefulness, are not equal substitutes for Saudi Arabia.

What are Saudi Arabia’s security goals and objectives? First and most important at present, it is clearly in Saudi Arabia’s interests (both in terms of the Al Sa‘ud and Saudi society as a whole) to confront and defeat Islamist extremism, both domestically and worldwide. Cooperation with the United States and assistance to and from Washington is in Saudi Arabia’s interest, as well as America’s.

Saudi Arabia’s international security and defense policy has been built painstakingly and almost exclusively on close ties to the US. Most of same security concerns and/or threat potentials that existed before 11 September continue to concern the kingdom, as pointed out above. Riyadh continues to require extensive help in improving and professionalizing its armed forces – help of the sort that the United States and, to a lesser extent, its European allies, provide at present.

Similarly to Saudi Arabia’s role for the US, the kingdom has no real alternatives to depending on the US for security needs. Could Saudi Arabia, in an extreme situation, transfer its security partnership from the US to Western Europe? It is possible, since Europe has had and continues to maintain a military presence in the Gulf. Furthermore, Europe already provides significant amounts of arms and materiel to Saudi Arabia and the GCC, and it also offers multiple investment opportunities (GCC-Europe trade already outstrips that of GCC-US trade). Britain in particular enjoys long-standing excellent relations with all the GCC states;

But Europe is difficult to deal with a single unit, unlike the administration in Washington. Europe’s military power – and especially its force projection capabilities – is inferior to that of the US. Most tellingly, Europe could hardly be expected to side with Saudi Arabia should a serious dispute arise with the United States.

What about Russia? It has long been a player in the Gulf, although its history of involvement has more often than not been in support of regimes opposed to Riyadh. But bridges of cooperation and understanding would have to be built virtually from scratch and the effort might not be worthwhile. For the Saudis, much of a half-century of military development, training, and doctrine would have to be replaced and the Saudi model of economic development inevitably would be altered.

Russia’s force projection capabilities are nearly non-existent and Moscow cannot provide the sort of investment and export-import climate on which Saudi businesses depend. Furthermore, the two countries are cut-throat competitors in the international oil-export arena and Russia is not in a position to go head to head with the United States over what for it must be a marginal interest.

China is even less attractive. Yes, it has military hardware for sale but its economy is still developing. It has no force projection capabilities and has evinced little interest in developing them, or any serious involvement in the Gulf

A fully integrated GCC is still far too small in mass and too weak to assure its own security against external attack, while a broader Gulf security pact with Iran and Iraq is simply unthinkable for the foreseeable future and greater Arab cooperation was entertained and discarded in the Damascus Declaration experiment after the Kuwait War

Saudi Arabia has long relied on Pakistan in many respects, including the stationing of Pakistani troops in the kingdom and the provision of Pakistani pilots for the Saudi air force in the past. But, as mentioned above, Pakistan faces its security problems and is probably, fundamentally, as much a liability for Riyadh as it may be for the US.

There has been a minor flurry of recent speculation that Saudi Arabia might seek to develop a nuclear capability, perhaps to counter Israel’s present and Iran’s potential capabilities and as a sort of high-tech shortcut to overcome the kingdom’s structural military weaknesses. There has been speculation that Riyadh has assisted in Pakistan’s nuclear program and stands to benefit from the resultant “Islamic bomb.”

After all, the argument goes on to note, Saudi Arabia bought a number of CSS-2 Silkworm ballistic missiles from China in the mid-1980s without notifying the US – and in fact, kept their purchase completely secret from Washington. Most or all of these missiles appear still to remain operational, although increasingly obsolete and only equipped with conventional warheads.

It should be remembered though that the Silkworms were purchased in the context of the acquisition of missiles by Iraq and Iran and their deployment during these countries’ “war of the cities.” There has never been any evidence offered in support of such speculation and it is seriously doubtful that Saudi Arabia would risk a major confrontation with the United States over nuclear capabilities, particularly in the present atmosphere.

It should be recalled that US anger over the Silkworms resulted in a strong diplomatic demarche to Riyadh and the subsequent expulsion of the US ambassador as persona non grata. Can Riyadh really afford to jeopardize its already shaky relations with Washington over a nuclear program that can, at best, offer it only marginal and limited benefit? The chances of an Israeli attack on Saudi Arabia are virtually nil. Iran is unlikely to provoke hostilities and Saudi interests would seem to be better served by maintaining and strengthening the current rapprochement. And what use are nuclear weapons against Islamic extremists?

Despite the lack of alternatives on both sides, there will continue to be friction in the US-Saudi security relationship, regardless of how well or poorly overall bilateral relations fare. Saudi Arabia’s fundamental national interests lie in a policy of inclusion and not exclusion, as the US promotes in the region. That is, it must maintain correct and productive relations with Iran, Syria, the Palestinian Authority, and other regional actors that bear directly on Saudi security but with whom the US is not in favor.

Iraq will remain a problem for Saudi Arabia for years to come. Saudi Arabia’s close relationship with the US and thus the inevitable linkage with American policy in Iraq, has gained it considerable enmity throughout the Arab world. Iraq is politically unstable today and will remain so for years to come. Even if the United States is able to install a functioning, independent government in Baghdad, the future of the country cannot be assured and threats to Saudi Arabia (and/or its GCC allies) remain real and possible for the foreseeable future.

The continuation of strife between Israelis and Palestinians seems, unfortunately, equally likely to persist – and may well remain the most problematic and damaging factor in US-Saudi relations.

The key element of US-Saudi security relations remain US military support for the kingdom through, first, provision of arms, equipment, and training, and, second, maintenance of an American security umbrella over the kingdom and its GCC neighbors. The first point does not arouse debate – it is a mostly win-win situation for the United States: not only does the US maintain a presence (and ears) in the kingdom, it also provides financial advantages for both the US government and private-sector suppliers.

But there is considerable concern voiced in Saudi Arabia about the excessive financial burden of arms purchases and logistical agreements. Saudi Arabia can no longer afford to buy whatever it wishes at top-of-the-rack prices and it behooves the United States to recognize this and adjust its policies accordingly.

The second point is more problematic at first glance, since the strains over Saudi reluctance to publicly support the US in the recent Iraq War – and the well-known opposition of Islamic extremists for the presence of foreign troops in the Holy Land – have prompted the removal of US units from the kingdom.

But remember that Saudi Arabia and other GCC states had been highly reticent to permit US basing on their territory long before the Kuwait War, and that the US forces removed last summer were there only “temporarily” to enforce the Iraqi “no-fly” zones. In part, it still remains possible to provide an “over-the-horizon” protection, even if that horizon now includes “over-the-border” aspects in Qatar and other GCC states. Still, at some point, greater and more systematic access to Saudi facilities will prove necessary under a format that satisfies the needs and sensitivities of both parties.

But, in addition to direct security relations, the United States will continue to encourage and benefit from Saudi Arabia’s leading role in the GCC. While there are tensions in this relationship as well (largely due to Saudi Arabia’s predominant size and a lack of finesse on occasion in dealing with its GCC allies), any weakening or divisions in the GCC will harm both Saudi and American interests. Furthermore, US will benefit from Saudi moderation in pan-Arab circles, whether on Arab-Israeli matters or in engaging radical Arab states (for example, the Saudi role in encouraging Libya’s recent spirit of accommodation), and from Saudi Arabia’s leading role in broader Islamic circles.

In a perfect world, there would be no disagreements between friends who have far more in common than they have disagreements. But this is not a perfect world. And disagreements can arise even with America’s oldest allies, as recent Franco-American relations demonstrate. From an international security point-of-view, it is undeniable that both the United States and Saudi Arabia would suffer considerable damage from any a breakdown in their long-standing security relationship.

Another Bombing in Riyadh

[Original publication on this website, 13 November 2003. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

Saudi Arabia’s capital of Riyadh suffered another terrorist bombing on 9 November 2003, killing as many as 18 people and wounding more than 120 more. Since the attack displayed a similar modus operandi as the 12 May 2003 bombing of other residential compounds, most observers – including the Saudi and American governments – placed the blame on al-Qa‘idah. This seems a reasonable assumption, given that network’s declaration of its intentions to strike at expatriates in the kingdom and the crescendoing series of confrontations between the Saudi security forces and pockets of Islamist extremists throughout much of the kingdom since the 12 May bombings.

One prominent American newspaper editorialized that since Usamah b. Ladin had called for the expulsion of American forces from Saudi Arabia and since American forces have now departed, this proves that al-Qa‘idah’s target must therefore be the Al Sa‘ud ruling family. This assumption may prove to be far too hasty. First, it is flawed in its reasoning that, since the United States removed its regional operations center and the US military units stationed in the kingdom to bases in nearby countries, there is no longer any basis for Usamah b. Ladin’s objection.

In fact, US military personnel and civilian contractors on military-related projects remain at their jobs in Saudi Arabia. Some 30,000 Americans continue to live and work there, as do thousands of Britons, Irish, and other Europeans. Even where Westerners are not directly involved, it is obvious that the country’s development strategy, oil policy, security arrangements, and commercial interests are driven by Western-educated and Western-influenced Saudis and the kingdom continues to place enormous reliance on its relationship with the United States and the West.

This more fundamental connection is undoubtedly as abhorrent – if not more so – to Usamah b. Ladin and his allies than the mere presence of foreign troops on Saudi soil. For an ideology that places so much stress on outward appearances, such as observing the ban on alcohol and the cloaking of women’s public appearance, the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia most likely forms a symbolic object of remonstrance for opposition to the broader orientation of the kingdom around a perceived Westernization.

At the very least, this episode, coming on top of the 12 May bombings and the continuing saga of arrests and shoot-outs with radical Islamists, should put an end to those ill-informed critics of the kingdom who have rashly claimed that the régime and the Al Sa‘ud are either in secret alliance with al-Qa‘idah or have paid off the organization in some sort of bizarre blackmail to leave Saudi Arabia alone. It should, but I doubt it will since many of these critics and instant experts seem to be motivated by an innate hostility to Saudi Arabia far more than by concern with the issues or understanding of the kingdom or Islam.

Their opposite numbers are the terrorists who have carried out these suicide bombings and whose members have been apprehended by Saudi security forces, as well as, of course, those individuals who are still at large. It has been noted that most of the victims in the Muhayya compound struck on 9 November were Arabs or from Asian countries, rather than Americans or other Westerners. There has been some speculation that this was due to faulty intelligence on the part of the perpetrators – i.e. they were unaware that the compound was not inhabited by large numbers of Westerners. This explanation seems unlikely, as does the idea that the goal of the perpetrators is to destabilize the régime and thus bring down the ruling family.

The Muhayya compound may have been chosen precisely because of its Arab and Muslim residents. The disclosure that the recent capture of militants and arms caches in Makkah included the discovery of booby-trapped Qur’ans and water bottles – items destined for use by Muslim pilgrims – reinforces the suspicion that the primary goal is chaos, a total renunciation of the existing order, perhaps – and only perhaps – to produce a “clean slate” on which to create the extremists’ view of a proper order.

Are the theorists executing this strategy loyal members or allies of al-Qa‘idah, thus indicating an even more sinister and less objectively rational downward spiral in al-Qa‘idah’s beliefs? Such a nihilistic strategy may prove to be the link – if any exists – to the wave of terror sweeping Iraq. Or has a decimation in the ranks of al-Qa‘idah’s leadership brought inferior and less stable leaders to the fore? Or are these acts and intentions evidence of a lack of leadership, of the emergence of deranged individuals in a vacuum who seek to kill simply for the objective of killing? Is it really al-Qa‘idah at work, or only imitators, in the same way that serial killers provoke copycats?

There is no doubt that the recent wave of shocking incidents has worried all Saudis and presents grave challenges to the régime and the ruling family. And, yes, it may be true, as some critics allege, that the Saudi government did not act after 11 September 2001 as strongly as it has begun to act after 12 May 2003. But this is not unusual: after all, airport security in the United States up to 10 September 2001 was a farce, as lax if not worse than standards in many Third World countries. As for those critics who shout that the kingdom is in free fall and collapsing, get real.

Saudi Arabia and the United States, Again

[Original publication on this website, 14 May 2003. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

Al-Qa`idah apparently has struck again with the simultaneous bombings of residential compounds in Riyadh. And once again the finger-pointing is crescendoing in the United States. The initial accusation is that in its haste to attack Iraq the US administration has ignored or forgotten about al-Qa`idah. Not far behind is a recrudescence of accusations against Saudi Arabia: it supports terrorism, its ruling elite flirts with al-Qa`idah, the kingdom is not doing its part in the "war against terror," the Saudis are anti-American, etc., etc.

Make no mistake, the war on Iraq was ill-advised and is and, will continue to be, a festering wound in American foreign policy. Did the administration's obsession with Saddam lead it to ignore al-Qa`idah? No doubt this charge can be levelled against some individual officials but it is ridiculous to think that the entire US government, including the politicians in charge, have complacently dropped al-Qa`idah to a back-burner. At most, the administration can be declared guilty of under-estimating al-Qa`idah – but who hasn't been guilty of this? At best, the tragic bombing in Riiyadh provides further proof that the blows struck against al-Qa`idah and its organization (as much as that concept actually applies) have been damaging but certainly not fatal.

It is clear, contrary to the pronouncements of some of the self-proclaimed "experts" on Saudi Arabia and terrorism beloved by the media, that the planning for the Riyadh bombings began months ago, most likely before the Iraq War began and long before Washington's announcement that it was removing American troops from Saudi Arabia. And it should be equally obvious to anyone rational that supporting al-Qa`idah or terrorism is definitely not in Saudi Arabia's interests.

Is Saudi Arabia to blame for the latest bombings? Not directly of course. Extremists exist in all societies, including America and Europe, and the charge that the Al Sa`ud turn a blind eye to extremism can be easily rebutted. But it is also true that the state is notorious for its unwillingness to keep the public informed and accept responsibility for unwelcome or inconvenient consequences. Clearly the government, whether through neglect or simply slowness in shaking up cumbersome and ineffective bureaucracies, has been slow to come to grips with the internal threat posed by extremists. There is a long litany of explosions and attacks in the kingdom, against Saudis as well as against expatriates. A few days before the last bombings, Saudi security forces raided what appears to have been an al-Qa`idah safe house in Riyadh and confiscated large numbers of arms and explosives. To the government's credit, it publicly announced the existence of the cell and the only partial success of its operation. But all 19 targeted extremists managed to escape and may have been responsible for the subsequent attacks.

It was recently my misfortune recently to hear a talk by a British university lecturer, claiming to be a Middle East expert apparently without ever visiting the region or studying it seriously, in which he dropped a casual remark that Saudi Arabia is "dysfunctional." To anyone who has lived in Saudi Arabia, has visited there, or knows anything about the kingdom, this is plainly ridiculous. Yes, Saudi Arabia has problems. It has serious problems. But it is not the only country in the world with problems and it seems better equipped to handle its problems than many other states. The essential question is how quickly and effectively is the kingdom moving beyond recognition of its problems to executing the steps necessary to solve them. Correct timing is essential. Move too quickly and risk alienating much of society while weakening the strength and legitimacy of the state. Move too slowly and risk alienating the same and other elements of society while not eradicating an environment in which extremists flourish.

In a recent Adelphi Paper (accessible elsewhere on this website), I argued that, despite the difficulties and disagreements – both old and new – in its relationship with the United States, Saudi Arabia has no practical choice but cling to the relationship, just as it is in the United States' fundamental interest to perpetuate it as well. A loosening of the ties in some areas – such as regional security arrangements – is best accompanied by a strengthening of ties in other areas. Saudi Arabia clearly has gone some distance to address American concerns about its policies and internal problems. Equally clearly, it has some distance yet to go.

A Note on Terminology: "Gulf War"

[Original publication on this website, 14 May 2003. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved]

Much of the media and a number of commentators have started a bad habit of referring to the American war on Iraq as the "Second Gulf War," thus redefining the 1991 liberation of Kuwait as the "First Gulf War." This is plain wrong and should be avoided.

In the first place, the use of the term "Gulf War" is ethnocentric and inaccurate. It implies that the entire Gulf, or at least most of it was in flames in 1990-1991. While all littoral states of the Gulf obviously were concerned about events, the war took place in only two out of the eight. Saudi Arabia obviously felt threatened and was the base for much of the coalition's response to Iraq. The other four smaller Gulf states contributed a few troops and use of their facilities but were essentially onlookers while Iran remained fully on the periphery. By the same standards, the recent upheavals in the Balkans should be termed the "European War" and the American excursions into Grenada and Panama the "Caribbean Wars."

The second objection to calling the Iraq War the "Second Gulf War" and the Kuwait War the "First Gulf War" is one of an Alzheimer's moment on the part of the self-same media and enthusiasts. The same people and institutions earlier blithely referred to the Iran-Iraq War as the "Gulf War" and then, when American and Western forces became involved in fighting, simply forgot about the old "Gulf War" and christened the new conflict as the "Gulf War." Apart from the confusion and inaccuracy that this causes, it devalues the losses of hundred of thousands of lives in the eight years of fighting between Iran and Iraq by erasing them from the historical memory simply because they were not American or British lives. This is not right. It is not honorable.

Can We Really Call It Victory?

[Original publication on this website, 2 May 2003. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

Yesterday, US President George W. Bush declared that major combat operations in Iraq were over, although he pointedly said there could be no legal end to the war. This announcement followed by a few days a statement by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld – made at an American military camp in Doha during his post-war Gulf tour – disparaging those who had opposed the administration’s attack on Iraq.

Clearly, the administration has declared success for its self-initiated war and vindication for its misnamed “pre-emptive” strategy. But in reality what has been achieved? Iraq lies in tatters, Saddam Husayn and his closest lieutenants (like al-Qa‘idah’s leaders) remain at large, and there still is no evidence of Iraqi WMD. And President Bush inexplicably continues to claim that Iraq has been an ally of al-Qa‘idah and provided funding for it when there is no credible evidence to support this.

While it appears that American forces are beginning to exercise some civil administration, no realistic prospect for a representative Iraqi government is on the horizon. It may be argued that it is premature to expect effective political reconstruction in only a few weeks. But the prospects for a viable, independent, and truly representative national replacement government appear even less imminent than they did before the war.

The Kurds in the north long ago organized a working system for their region although Kurdish authority is undermined by reports of the expulsion of Arab residents of Kurdistan. Well-organized Islamist groups struggle for control of the Shi‘i heartland in the south and center and US policy seems to be little more than declaring it will not accept an Islamic republic and keeping well away. And what happens should an electoral majority of Shi‘ah declare that an Islamic republic is in fact what they want? American control of the country’s center is insecure and relations with the area’s Sunni population uneasy. One need not have much sympathy for the removal of Baghdad’s self-declared mayor but the peremptory nature of the American action is little cause for comfort. Rather than succeeding in the difficult task of gaining trust, the American presence has been marred by the deaths caused by shooting into civilian crowds, twice recently in Fallujah and earlier in Mosul.

Perhaps American pressure facilitated the appointment of Mahmud ‘Abbas as the Palestinian Prime Minister and the acceptance of his cabinet by Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian parliament. But the dusting off of the “road map” to Middle East peace will not get very far unless the administration begins to exert appropriate pressure on Ariel Sharon as well. A few sympathetic words are not going to resurrect the Oslo process from the ranks of the dead.

The announcement of the removal of American military forces from Saudi Arabia is a welcomed step but in itself does not address the problem of deterioration in US-Saudi relations. Transfer of those forces to neighboring Gulf Cooperation Council states is not a long-term solution either. While their presence in Qatar or the UAE is unlikely to arouse the same level of Islamist passions, the low esteem in which the United States is held by public opinion in those countries does not augur well for a permanent welcome. The suspicion remains alive that this administration’s answer lies in establishing permanent bases in Iraq, a move that fairly oozes disaster.

And this does not begin to address the considerable damage that lies farther afield. The White House promises revenge on France for its failure to support its belligerence and Bush’s lieutenant in this enterprise, Prime Minister Tony Blair, is soundly rebuffed by Moscow. Clearly, American unilateralism and belligerence has damaged relations around the world, the American image has plummeted, boycotts of American products are on the rise, and the climate for foreign investment in the United States is beginning to suffer. Where is the victory in this?

Iraq and the Middle East in the Aftermath of This Month's War

[Original publication on this website, 14 April 2003. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

This morning, my radio cheerily announced that since the war in Iraq was all but over, the stock markets were turning their attention to financial concerns and therefore were surging upwards. This echoed the comments of President George W. Bush proclaiming a successful campaign and the release of a new public opinion poll supporting America's war on Iraq and backing similar actions against Syria, North Korea, and others if the administration deemed it necessary. All is well in America it seems.

My mind must be in another dimension for I am fundamentally unable to comprehend the reasoning behind this attitude. The Bush administration launched this war, by its own rhetoric, to oust Saddam Husayn, to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, to institute regime change in Iraq, and to instill a climate for democracy in the Middle East. What has it accomplished so far?

As of today, the whereabouts of Saddam Husayn and most of his circle are unknown. The regime change accomplished so far has been a shift to anarchy, hardship, death, and destruction. Despite all its claims of possessing intelligence regarding Iraq's possession of WMD, the US has yet to confirm a single WMD find. It appears that all 1000 of Iraq's oil wells were quickly secured, along with all military installations and presidential palaces. But American troops stood by as the National Museum was completely looted and the Bush administration refused to take responsibility. The incalculable damage to Iraq's heritage and identity was compounded by the news today that the National Library was burned to the ground, days after the museum outrage and well after the US government knew that such a tragic crime could well happen. (The impression that Iraq and the war are already passing from American's attention was underpinned by the absence of any mention of the National Library in the local newspaper.) The protection of American soldiers' lives and intentions to minimize casualties to Iraqi civilians, perhaps "only" a few thousand deaths, are necessary and obligatory goals. But the invasion and military occupation of a country entails many other practical, moral, and legal responsibilities as well. Here the Bush administration undeniably has shirked responsibilities.

Iraq is in chaos and it is unclear to what extent the US government is prepared to deal with it adequately and appropriately. One certainly hopes that steps will be taken quickly to assure the continuation (or restoration) of food supplies, electricity, water, sewage, and simple law and order functions, including the use of American and British forces in a policing role. The deeper and more difficult question concerns the future administration and leadership of post-Saddam Iraq. The steps taken so far by the Bush administration do not inspire confidence. Washington continues to push for prominent roles for totally unsuitable exiles such as Ahmad Chalabi and Nizar al-Khazraji. The claim that Ayatallah Sistani had issued a favorable fatwa in al-Najaf appears to be false, whether due to ignorance or straightforward deception is not clear. Britain has chosen a questionable "sheik" to exercise authority in Basra. It would be nearly impossible to create a cohesive, viable, and truly representative government in Iraq under the best of conditions. It is virtually unthinkable for this to occur under the control of an ideologically motivated clique within the Bush administration whose priorities seem to have little to do with the welfare of the Iraqi people.

Will the war on Iraq facilitate the emergence of democracy in the Middle East? Even if this was a real intention of the Bush administration and not simply propaganda, the war's impact is far more likely to be negative than positive. Sadly, the image of the United States that this war has reinforced in Iraqis, Arabs, and other peoples around the world is not one of America as a beacon of democracy and justice but of a heavy-handed oppressor, enamored of its own technology and disdainful of world opinion.

Many people in the region firmly believe that the United States launched this war to gain control of Iraq's oil. The pattern of post-war "reconstruction" contracts to American firms is not likely to assuage their fears. Given the deep ideological nature of the administration and its bellicose attitude, any future Iraqi government will have to toe the line. In the short term, a military occupation is unavoidable. In the longer term, it must be assumed that this administration expects a compliant Baghdad government to provide it with military bases and rights of movement, as well as access to oil on favorable terms and political and diplomatic support. This is likely to be irreconciliable with the wishes of many Iraqis and undoubtedly will be seen by most Arabs as evidence that the US has imposed a second mandate on Iraq.

With the destruction of Saddam's regime, Washington -- and particularly the hawks -- are belligerently demanding that Syria fall into line and of course Iran continues to be viewed as a target. It beggars the imagination that the Bush administration is actually contemplating a strategy of invading Syria while the smoke still rises over Iraq. But scarcely 18 months ago the idea that the United States government would defy the United Nations and most of its allies to attack and lay waste to Iraq was similarly unfathomable.

Since 11 September 2001, the Bush administration has invaded Afghanistan, admittedly destroying the abominable Taliban but leaving the country in ruins. It has seriously hampered the operations of al-Qa`idah but has failed to destroy its top leaders or the organization, at the expense of creating grievous harm to civil liberties and of raising public apprehensions by false allegations of connections without credible evidence. It has got rid of Saddam Husayn but has left a trail of destruction in its wake that some have compared to the medieval sack of Baghdad by Hulagu. And now it threatens similar devastation elsewhere. War and deathly retribution are not the only methods of dealing with authoritarian regimes. Nor can it be said they are the best or even most efficient. It is simply madness to subordinate the loudly proclaimed American ideals of democracy and justice to such mindless mayhem.

The War of American Hubris

[Original publication on this website, 20 March 2003. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

War began this morning with an attempted assassination of Saddam Husayn and retaliatory missile strikes on Kuwait. Years ago, in a production of “The Dutchess of Amalfi” at the National Theatre in London, the hooded figure of Death lounged around the periphery of the stage throughout the performance, always present. Death is hovering now around Iraq.

This is not simply a war to oust a dictator, a war to disarm a régime of its weapons of mass destruction. It is a war of American hubris. In fact, it has little to do with Iraq or with Saddam Husayn. Despite the declarations of President Bush and his advisers, Iraq is not a threat to global peace. Iraq is not a direct threat to the United States. Deterrence and containment have emasculated the threat to even his neighbors.

No, this war is more about a belligerent vision of America’s place in the world. It is a war devised and planned since the beginning of this Bush administration. Its proponents have pushed their plans into reality by utilizing the trauma of the 11 September attacks to create support among a fearful and paranoid American populace.

Americans have long been infamous for their ignorance and dismissal of the rest of the world. But this administration has worked overtime to antagonize long-standing allies and to dismiss countries and institutions that disagreed with its goals. It is notable that, despite the Bush administration’s declarations of a coalition of supporting states in this war, the United States is perhaps the only country in the world in which more people support the war than oppose it. It is notable that none of the six American allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council, the countries most at risk from Saddam Husayn, has endorsed the war. It is equally notable that these states, ignoring the dismay and opposition of their own people, have been pressured into quietly providing logistical support for American forces. There can be little doubt that if these countries had elected legislatures, they would have vetoed this support as did the Turkish parliament.

It is not the first time that the United States has pursued an international agenda without regard to the consequences and it probably will not be the last. Indeed, there are far too many shadows of past American actions that cloud this war. The Bush administration has decided that it wants this war and, even more, that nothing or no one will dissuade it – global opposition, breaches with key European allies, the refusal of the United Nations to sanction the war, all were dismissed as irrelevant.

It is a one-sided contest and undoubtedly the fighting will not be prolonged. But the consequences will reverberate for years and probably decades. An American victory and occupation of Iraq may eventually result in a better government and standard of living there – but perhaps not. It will not help solve the Palestinian-Israeli impasse, a problem that this administration has blithely and consistently ignored. It is debatable that a democratic government in Iraq, if that is even achieved, will have truly significant repercussions throughout the Middle East. It can be argued with equal plausibility that the anti-Americanism that this war will intensify will threaten friendly governments in the region and that, should any succumb, successor régimes will be far less friendly to the United States.

More globally, the drive to war already has destroyed much of the sympathy and good-will engendered by the 11 September tragedy. The long-term effect is likely to be a recrudescence of antipathy and suspicion about American motives and methods in even the closest countries and peoples. It is not a price worth paying.

What's in a Name?

[Original publication on this website, 14 March 2003. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

At one time the BBC operated a unit that advised announcers on the proper pronunciation of non-English names and words. One assumes that this unit has been closed down, judging from the persistence of BBC announcers in giving al-Qa‘idah a hillbilly twist as “kaa-eeda” (one almost imagines the following words to be, “where y’all from, boy?”) The BBC is not alone in this, of course, and perhaps one should not expect the media to be able to correctly pronounce every foreign word in the news.

On the other hand, given that millions of people who had never heard of al-Qa‘idah before 11 September have been bombarded subsequently with the name every day for a year and a half, common sense would seem to dictate that politicians and media should be able to absorb a reasonably correct pronunciation. Is there any reason that the name of the infamous bin Ladin should be pronounced in a way that makes it sound like an overburdened container ship?

For that matter, why does George W. Bush persist in referring to “ee-rack,” rather than “ih-rock”? Could it be that there is no one among his advisers who are actually familiar with Iraq, anyone with any knowledge of Arabic, for example? Imagine the fuss that would be made if he kept referring to “eye-talians.” For that matter, how many talking heads out there still call Iraq’s neighbor “eye-ran” instead of “ee-ron” (Iraq and Iran may look nearly the same in English but they are two entirely different words). Please, let's retire the pointless pronunciation of "catarrh" for the small but important country of Qatar ("cutter" is close enough). And could it be that the media’s corruption of Shi‘ah and Shi‘i into “Shiite” is at least in part due to the vulgar word it resembles?

Understandably, those referring to terrorist suspect José Padilla as “josey paddlela” were swiftly corrected. But why did no one notice when recently arrested al-Qa‘idah leader Khalid Shaykh Muhammad was persistently referred to as “ca-leed”?

All this – and more – could be dismissed as mere pedantry if it did not seem to signify a more troubling complacency and superficiality. A number of media sources, including wire services, have referred to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad as a Kuwaiti when in fact he is a Pakistani Baluch born in Kuwait – this makes him no more a Kuwaiti than the son or daughter of Turkish migrant workers born in Germany until recently would be entitled to German citizenship. Is this important? Yes, surprisingly, it is. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s experience as a poor boy born and growing up in a well-to-do country, a country which would never accept him as a fellow citizen, may help to explain his attraction to extremism, his apparent anomie a contributing factor in his joining the forces of al-Qa‘idah.

Perhaps I have missed it but I have not seen any media comment on the name of captured terrorist suspect Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. This would appear to be less a name than a description, since it translates as “the son of a Libyan shaykh.” And what about the suspects whose names are given as al-Kuwayti, al-Jaziri, al-Yamani, al-Qatari, al-Masri – meaning the Kuwaiti, the Algerian, the Yemeni, the Qatari, the Egyptian. Perhaps this is simply meant as shorthand for “John Doe” but how many people realize that? Or Ramzi binalshibh? Apart from the tongue-twisting pronunciations that this garbled spelling produces, has no one noticed that “ibn al-shaybah” simply means “the son of an old man”?

At best, this is sloppy journalism. When fed to the media by US government spokespersons, it is at best negligence. A small point, I know, and perhaps it really is pedantic. But it seems to me that we are already overburdened with too many superficialities and stereotypes. Stereotypes reduce complex situations and societies to black-and-white perceptions of right and wrong. And such stark views lead to intolerance, inflexibility, and mischaracterization of people and situations. After all, how many Americans would like to see their president routinely referred to as that guntoting cowboy Jahj Dubya Botch.

Hellfire in Yemen

[Original publication on this website, 9 November 2002. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

On Sunday, 4 November 2002, six suspected al-Qa‘idah operatives, one of them a US citizen, were killed in Yemen when their vehicle was destroyed by a Hellfire missile launched from an unmanned Predator reconnaissance aircraft controlled by the CIA from Djibouti.

This development is disturbing for a number of reasons. Despite what the United States government calls it, this was an act of assassination of individuals who were presumed but not proven guilty of any crime. Asserting that the action was justified because the United States is waging war, that this was a legitimate wartime act, and that the individuals were committing an act of terrorism, is no legitimate defense. This seems particularly true since the American action was carried out in a state with a functioning government and with which the United States is not at war, and it is not even clear that the Yemen government was informed of the impending strike, gave its approval, or even notified that the US intended to act unilaterally when the opportunity presented itself.

Assassination is assassination, no matter what euphemism is employed for it. Israeli policy during the second intifadah has been to employ assassination under the rubric “targeted killings” to eliminate Palestinians that Israel claims are involved in terrorist activities. In both cases, governments declare their victims guilty and ignore their own judicial systems and bases of law.

But employment of this type of aggressive policy has wider ramifications. Using such acts of assassination as a precedent, any country can claim similar justification to attack its enemies whenever and however it wishes, since the definition of “war” and “pre-emption” are self-defined by politicians to fit their current circumstances.

Both Israel and the United States have claimed that such acts are pre-emptive, that action outside the boundaries of normal law is justified in order to pre-empt terrorist acts that will otherwise cause loss of life. A “pre-emptive action” assumes that the targets are, at the time they are killed, in the actual process of committing a terrorist act. But there is rarely sufficient evidence to support this contention. In the Yemen case, the United States government not only has failed to produce any evidence to this effect but, furthermore, has not even made a claim that this was the case – rather, the act was justified because the targets were members of al-Qa‘idah who appeared to have been involved in the attacks in Yemen on the USS Cole and the French tanker Limburg, and who may well have been planning other future attacks.

The logical and civilized course would have been to apprehend the suspects and give them a proper and fair trial, presenting irrefutable evidence of their guilt in the courtroom and subjecting them to appropriate punishment. Obviously such a course presented difficulties. Determining the whereabouts of the suspects was problematic. But this did not prevent them from being targeted on 4 November. A Yemeni army operation to capture them had been tried before and ended unsuccessfully in bloodshed. But a foreign military strike in a tribal area only weakens the hand of the Yemeni government and convinces tribes that the only response to state (and external) authority must be to retain autonomy and remain heavily armed.

Furthermore, the record of human rights in Yemen is bad enough without the United States providing the Yemen government with an example and precedent about how to deal simply and quickly with its opponents.

There can be no doubt that al-Qa‘idah, in whatever form and under whatever leadership, poses a deadly threat to the United States and many other states and peoples around the world. But cowboy vengeance is not the proper way of dealing with the problem. If you play by al-Qa‘idah’s rules, then you risk sinking to the level of al-Qa‘idah.

Why the American Response to 11 September Has Gone Seriously Wrong

[Original publication on this website, 10 November 2001. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]


In the last two months, a spectacularly hideous terrorist success has metamorphosed into a no-holds-barred war, pitting the world’s only superpower against one of the world’s poorest and weakest countries. The prolonged bombardment of Afghanistan is accompanied by an often jingoistic attitude that revenge must be achieved no matter the cost, that Islam is violent and Muslims are not to be trusted, that Saudis in particular are untrustworthy and anti-American, and that anyone who disagrees with this is unpatriotic. Has everyone gone completely mad? My field is Middle East politics, not military affairs, so I have no way of knowing whether the Bush administration’s objectives in the field will be successful or the United States will end up trapped in another quagmire. What I do know, however, is this so-called “war against terror” is a huge mistake and will have appalling consequences throughout the world for years to come. What has gone wrong here? A few hints.

1. “War Against Terror.” The tragic events of 11 September were not an attack by another power and thus an act of war. Rather the attacks were an international criminal act. Instead of cries of revenge and retaliation, President George W. Bush should be calling for justice – and where justice is imperfect in the present international arena, the United States Government should be working to improve international law and order instead of opposing emergent institutions such as the International Criminal Court.

2. “The Evidence Against Usamah bin Ladin.” The Bush administration has claimed to have conclusive evidence that Usamah bin Ladin and his al-Qa’idah group are responsible for the 11 September attacks. But it has refused to make this evidence public on grounds of national security. The consequence has been that much of the Islamic world and well beyond remains convinced that the Bush administration is simply using its superior military weight to attack whomever it wishes in a misguided war of rage.

3. “Get rid of the Taliban and establish a New Afghani Government.” Haven’t we heard this before? Let us remember than many of the leading figures in this administration – Cheney, Rumsfeld, Powell, Wolfowitz, Armitage et al. – held senior positions under George Bush 41. They prosecuted the 1991 war against Iraq but left office with America’s Iraqi policy in a mess. After ten months back in office, this team still has yet to do anything about Iraq. Indeed, some of these figures are pushing for the United States to occupy southern Iraq, install a puppet government derived from the ineffective, unrepresentative, and corrupt Iraqi opposition, and wait for Saddam to fall. Not politically acceptable? No problem, just apply the policy to Afghanistan instead, where the fragmented opposition to the Taliban has about the same following and competence as its Iraqi counterpart.

4. “Threat from Islam or Threat to Islam.” The fatally flawed book on “The Clash of Civilizations” has received considerable attention in the last month and has been the basis of many an instant expert’s view that Islam is indeed a violent religion hostile to the West. This is absolute nonsense. Islam is no more, and probably far less, violent than Christianity and fanatic Muslims are no more representative of the worldwide Muslim community than fanatic Christians, Jews, and Hindus are of their societies. No matter what their rhetoric, Islamist extremists such as Usamah bin Ladin pursue a political agenda, not a religious one. They are no different in this respect from extremists in Northern Ireland, for example, who loudly proclaim their Catholicism or their Protestantism in order to remake Ulster’s political map. Meanwhile, a publicized visit to a mosque or the muttered homily that Muslims are not our enemies does not begin to undo the enormous damage of an increase in bigotry and hatred. And Muslims are not the only victims – as shown by the killing of a Sikh man in Arizona simply because he wore a turban.

5. “Middle Eastern-looking suspects.” For the life of me, I cannot understand how anyone – especially notoriously parochial Americans – can identify “Middle Easterners” at a glance. Having spent more than 30 years studying, visiting, working in, and writing about the Middle East, I would never be able to make such a visual identification with any certainty. I’ve known red-haired, freckled Lebanese, Palestinians with lighter complexions than most Europeans, a North African who was the spitting image of Archie Bunker, and a businessman from the United Arab Emirates who looked like the fraternal twin of a Swedish acquaintance. I would not be surprised if most people accused of being “Middle Eastern-looking” were of Hispanic origin (nearly all Saudis who have studied in the US have had the experience of being addressed in Spanish). All this leads me to wonder whether “Middle Eastern-looking” is simply another codeword for mindless prejudice?

6. “Saudi Muslim millionaire terrorist.” Ubiquitous media references to Usamah bin Ladin prefaced in this way are no more constructive or representative of Saudi Arabia or Muslims than similar, and equally justifiable, references to the “American Christian terrorist” Timothy McVeigh would be. The consequence? Reinforcement of the slanderous stereotype that all Saudis are hostile, anti-American, narrow-minded, and driving around expensive cars while their mindsets are stuck back in the seventh century. This is simply ridiculous.

7. “Saudi Bashing.” It has suddenly become fashionable to attack Saudi Arabia. If they are not with us (i.e., meekly accept whatever an arrogant United States government tells them to do), they must be against us. The New York Times publishes a vicious and error-filled editorial attacking “Saudi Arabia’s tolerance for terrorism” and its “malignant behavior.” One of its columnists blindly and naively claims that “The Saudis never have been on America's side in the war on terror.” The mayor of New York rejects a prominent Saudi’s humanitarian gesture of a $10 million check for relief because he doesn’t like his politics. Based only on “anonymous sources” within the US government, a journalist writing in the New Yorker claims that “the growing instability of the Saudi régime ... [is] the most immediate threat to American economic and political interests in the Middle East.” An American senator accuses the Saudis of playing a “double game” of giving extremists free rein at home and financing their groups.

Yes, corruption exists in the kingdom and women are restricted in their physical movements. Yet the extent to which the Saudi government has developed the country (including a comprehensive and free health system that puts the United States to shame), the ability of the ruling family to protect the country from a long series of external threats and prod a highly conservative population towards change, and the enviable emphasis on education for both men and women (it has long been said that there are more American-trained Ph.D.s in the Saudi cabinet than there are in the US cabinet and Congress combined) puts these instant experts to shame.

Is Saudi Arabia about to collapse? The same sorts of instant experts have been saying the same things since the 1940s: it cannot outlast the death of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (who restored the Saudi state in the early 20th century and presided over the early years of oil-fuelled change); it cannot withstand the challenge of Arab nationalism in the 1960s; it will suffer the same fate as the Shah of Iran did in 1979; it is being destroyed from within by Islamic extremists today. No doubt the kingdom has its fair share of problems but at least it has learned how to survive.

Wahhabism is not an extremist sect. Pay attention now: it is not even a sect but a reform movement clearly within mainstream Islam emphasizing austerity and piety. All of those charging Saudi Arabia with creating the menace of Usamah bin Ladin and the Arab Afghans conveniently seem to suffer from collective amnesia about the same American role at the same time. The fact is that Saudi Arabia and the United States have created a strong, multi-faceted relationship over more than half-a-century, despite significant underlying differences. It is a fantasy to think that a sudden stream of vitriol or the involvement of a few Saudis in extremist activities will destroy that relationship. Now, is anybody listening?

[Strategic Comment originally posted on the International Institute for Strategic Studies website in January 2001]

In a region of autocratic rule and minimal public participation in politics, expectations of moves towards liberalisation and democratisation are growing in Qatar and Bahrain. Although change is likely to be incremental, the two countries' rulers represent the first wave of a younger, more progressive generation of Gulf leaders. Both Qatar and Bahrain are showing interest in constitutional reform that could dilute the power wielded by their ruling families.

Only two years ago, it would have seemed unlikely that Bahrain could inspire political liberalisation in Qatar. But the changes that Bahrain's Sheikh Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifah is contemplating, if carried through, could spur Qatar's Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifah al-Thani to keep his promise of a new constitution and general elections.
At the end of 2000, Bahrain expanded the Majlis al-Shura, or Advisory Council, to represent more religious and ethnic minorities. The council appointed a committee to write a new national charter. The committee promptly recommended forming a constitutional monarchy with an independent judiciary, creating a second, but elected, body alongside the appointed Majlis al-Shura and holding municipal elections. A public referendum is to approve the document before its acceptance by the emir, Sheikh Hamad, who apparently would then become king.

In Qatar, the drafting of a new constitution has been underway since July 1999. This work should be completed by mid-2002 and could lead to an elected parliament replacing its Majlis al-Shura.
Qatar's path to reform

Qatar's Sheikh Hamad gained control of his country by anything but democratic means, seizing power on 27 June 1995 during his father's absence abroad. It was reminiscent of the manner in which his father, Sheikh Khalifah bin Hamad, had come to power in 1972 by declaring himself ruler while his cousin, the incumbent emir, was out of the country.

But both Sheikh Khalifah in 1972 and Sheikh Hamad in 1995 were to make their marks as reformers on the systems they inherited. Sheikh Khalifah was prime minister for some years before becoming emir. He continued to consolidate decision-making in his own hands - Qatar could be likened to a family business, run by a single individual. But he created the Majlis al-Shura and later expanded it to include emerging educated and younger sectors of the population. He reorganised the Council of Ministers to remove the automatic right to certain portfolios claimed by important branches of the large and often fractious ruling al-Thani family. Finally, Sheikh Khalifah laid the groundwork for exploiting Qatar's enormous natural gas reserves in the North Field.

As he grew older, Sheikh Khalifah began to withdraw from his duties and to hand over increasing responsibilities to his eldest son, Sheikh Hamad. Trained at Sandhurst in the UK, Sheikh Hamad had served as Qatar's Minister of Defence since the position was created in 1977. He had been named heir apparent at the same time. Similar to his father in his work habits and attention to detail, Sheikh Hamad began to exercise control over most government functions from 1992, when his father permitted him to form his own cabinet. Sheikh Khalifah's efforts to regain some of his powers appeared to lie behind the son's palace putsch.

Sheikh Hamad consolidated his position by appointing a new cabinet, which retained many of the ministers he had chosen in 1992. He also rewarded his brother Abdullah for his support by giving him the post of deputy prime minister in addition to the interior ministry, which he held already. A year later, the emir separated the Emiri Diwan (the Ruler's Office) from the formal executive structure of government by creating a separate Prime Minister's Office. He appointed Abdullah as premier – the first time that an emir had not held this position concurrently. The al-Thani family continued to dominate, holding 13 of the 20 cabinet portfolios, including defence, prime minister and interior, finance, economy and trade, and foreign affairs. But the new cabinet included more young, Western-educated ministers.

On 20 February 1996, the government announced that a counter-coup attempt by Sheikh Khalifah's supporters had failed. At the same time, it made thinly veiled accusations that neighbouring states Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates were implicated in the attempt. The United States was drawn into the dispute through efforts to mediate between Qatar and its aggrieved Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies.

Foreign policy shifts …

Sheikh Hamad apparently sought to offset his disputes within the GCC by relying more on his relationship with the US. He granted Washington access to military facilities. In 1996, Qatar became the second GCC state after Oman to permit Israel to open a trade office in its capital. The emirate also forged closer ties with Iran, partly to forestall Iranian poaching on the two countries' shared offshore gas field. It restored full diplomatic ties with its Gulf War foe, Iraq.

In the last several years, Sheikh Hamad's foreign policy has assumed a steadier course. He has continued to rely on good relations with the United States. The US has positioned equipment for an armoured brigade in Qatar. Qatar has offered to mediate between Washington and Tehran. The emir met President Bill Clinton in Washington in 1997 and sent his young son and heir apparent, Sheikh Jasim bin Hamad, on a similar trip in 2000. Unlike during his first year, such ties have not strained relations with GCC allies, apart from the usual exception of Bahrain.

In part, Sheikh Hamad's manoeuvres appeared aimed at attracting world attention to his small country. In November 2000, Qatar hosted the Organisation of the Islamic Conference summit – although the government's reluctance to close the Israeli trade office in Doha nearly caused a boycott by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Iran. Immediately afterwards, Qatar opened a bid to host the next ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organisation.
… and domestic changes

But the emir's dramatic shifts in domestic policy undoubtedly will have a longer-lasting impact. His speech to the Majlis al-Shura in November 1996 set the scene for fundamental changes. The emir announced that the council would expand from 30 to 35 members and that he would head a new consultative Defence Council. He also declared that municipal elections would be held – the first elections in more than 35 years.

This set off a spirited round of campaigning, even though the municipal council would only have an advisory role and deliberate on relatively mundane issues. The 29 victors in the March 1999 polls were all men, but women were allowed both to vote and stand as candidates. This made Qatar the second Gulf state, after Oman, to grant women a political role. Also for the first time, elections were conducted for the board of the Qatari Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which is one of Qatar's few professional bodies and includes many of the country's most influential figures.

Soon after his accession, Hamad said it was time to draw up a 'permanent constitution' that would extend Qatar's 'pioneering experience in popular participation'. A 32-member committee was formed in July 1999 with a three-year mandate to draft a new document. This is likely to include provision for an elected parliament to replace the Majlis al-Shura.

The new emir also began relaxing control over information and media. The Gulf states have long been known for their ubiquitous ministries of information and strict censorship on political and moral grounds. But in 1995, Qatar removed most censorship and in 1998 even abolished its Ministry of Information. In 1996, key people behind the BBC's Arabic television service – closed after it was dropped from a Saudi-owned satellite television network – were snapped up by a new Qatari satellite station, al-Jazeera. The station soon built a huge audience throughout the Arab world for its willingness to tackle sensitive issues. Broadcasts provoked diplomatic rows with Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and Libya as well as complaints from nearly every other Arab government. The station appears to be another public statement by the emir that he is determined to go his own way.

Stirrings in Bahrain

Developments in Qatar in some ways mirror those in neighbouring Bahrain. In Bahrain, however, persistent political opposition throughout most of the twentieth century has put greater pressure on the ruling family. The Baharnah – an Arab, Shi'a and originally rural community – were behind the unrest of 1994-98. They are among the poorest Bahrainis even though they form a majority. One of their key demands was restoration of the elected National Assembly, created in 1973 but suspended two years later, an objective shared by most Bahrainis. The Majlis al-Shura created in 1993 provided little satisfaction.

After taking power following the death of his father in March 1999, the new emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Isa, sought to ease tensions left over from the earlier unrest. The government had earlier sought to contain dissent by exerting tight control rather than meeting any of its critics' demands or instituting significant reforms. But Hamad's early steps – releasing prisoners, including the most prominent dissident, Sheikh Abd al-Amir al-Jamri; permitting Amnesty International to investigate charges of police brutality in 1999; and broadening representation on the Majlis al-Shura in September 2000 – seemed to be tentative moves towards liberalisation and gaining public confidence.

The emir's announcement in October 2000 of impending constitutional changes indicate that he is serious about reforming his island state and winning over the opposition. Certainly expectations have been raised, even if the hard-core opposition remains unconvinced. More than a thousand people attended a public meeting in January 2001 to discuss these changes – an event that Hamad's father Sheikh Isa would never have permitted. It is likely that the promised referendum on the new constitution will be held in February.

Such reforms would be considered minor in many other parts of the world. It remains unlikely that any Gulf ruler would voluntarily give up the essential reins of power. But, aided by the distribution of oil revenues, the Gulf monarchies have long resisted significant structural changes and power-sharing. Thus, even small steps in one monarchy are watched carefully by rulers and people in all the other states. The first of the GCC states to embark on oil-funded development, Bahrain, has also confronted the strongest and most persistent opposition. If Sheikh Hamad of Bahrain succeeds in reconciling with his opponents, he could set a standard for developments up and down the Gulf.

Investigating the USS Cole Bombing

Update - 17 December 2000. Since the comment above was written, Yemeni officials have released more details about the principal suspects in the case. Six suspects have been named, all of Yemeni background and all veterans of the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The government has indicated that they will be put on trial following the ‘Id al-Fitr holiday which follows the end of Ramadan (i.e. early January 2001). However, the alleged mastermind of the operation, who is said to have funded the operation and directed the two individuals who actually carried out the bombing, is still at large. He has been identified as Muhammad ‘Umar al-Harazi, son of a Saudi mother and a Yemeni father from al-Haraz region west of the capital Sanaa. While the suspects apparently were well acquainted with Usamah bin Ladin and most likely fought alongside him in Afghanistan, hard evidence directly linking Usamah to the Cole bombing still seems to be elusive.

It is not entirely clear that complaints by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that it was not receiving full Yemeni cooperation have been resolved. While the FBI understandably has been concerned with acquiring evidence that could be used in US courts, the sheer numbers of FBI agents swarming over Aden in October and the initial use of helicopters to ferry personnel to sites from offshore without informing Yemeni air traffic control indicates a lack of sensitivity to Yemeni sovereignty.

Furthermore, some American insinuations that Yemeni government officials were involved in the plot have never been substantiated – the only implication of government employees appears to have been the connivance of a few local officials in Lahj province (near Aden) in issuing false identity cards to the bombers. Quite naturally many Yemenis have been upset by wild allegations that Yemen was somehow responsible for the bombing – claims were bandied about that Yemen was a hotbed of ‘Islamic terrorism’ and even that terrorists occupied important government positions. Yemen’s foreign minister was provoked to remark that the US must bear some responsibility for the climate of Islamic terrorism since it originally armed the Afghan Arabs, including Usamah bin Ladin. President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih echoed the feeling of many Yemenis that the bombing hurt Yemeni interests by damaging emerging relations with the United States and by dealing a further blow to Yemen’s reeling tourist industry.